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PUTTING PEACETIME FIRST: CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY AND THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION REQUIREMENT
Leila Nadya Sadat*
ABSTRACT
Unlike the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) may often exercise its jurisdiction in peacetime as well as
during armed conflict. Article 7 of the Rome Statute, on Crimes Against
Humanity, reflects this development, but does not address how to resolve the
interpretive difficulties that flow from it, particularly as regards the requirement
that the crime requires an attack directed against a “civilian” population. This
Article analyzes Article 7’s “civilian population” requirement, and argues it
should be understood from the perspective of peacetime, rather than as an
outgrowth of international humanitarian law (IHL). It is the first comprehensive
and systematic treatment of this issue. The Article rejects ICC Chambers’
reliance upon Article 50 of Protocol I as the relevant test and instead proposes
a three-part inquiry to establish whether or not an individual or population is
“civilian” in character: first, the situation is evaluated depending on whether it
involves crimes committed during or outside of armed conflict; second, if the
crimes have been committed during an armed conflict, IHL (applicable in NIAC
or IAC) should apply to a limited degree as a lex specialis to assist with the
determination; finally, the specific situation of the victims must be considered
and not just their formal status.
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Institute, Washington University (in St. Louis) School of Law. This Article represents the personal views of the
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Prosecutor. The author would like to thank Susan Appleton, Laurie Blank, Robert Cryer, Gerrit de Geest, Chris
Jenks, Amitis Khojasteh, David Law, Ronald Levin, and Peter Wiedenbeck for helpful comments, and Evelyn
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students in the Washington University Crimes Against Humanity Research Project for excellent research.
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INTRODUCTION
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 worked
an “uneasy revolution” in international law.1 Although resting on the experience
of the Nuremberg, Tokyo, and ad hoc international criminal tribunals,2 the ICC,
being both permanent and created outside the United Nations (U.N.) system—
but in relationship to it—is different in nature and kind than prior international
criminal tribunals. Most significantly, perhaps, is the Court’s ability to exercise
jurisdiction over situations taking place early in an “atrocity cascade”—that is,
in peacetime prior to the onset of war.3
In some ways, this should not be surprising. International criminal law
instruments are generally “peacetime” conventions,4 and the discipline as a
whole is fundamentally concerned with the cooperation of States in the
investigation and prosecution of international and transnational crimes.5 Yet
because only a handful of international crimes have ever been made justiciable
before international courts and tribunals, and these have generally been
adjudicated in the context of war, there has been an understandable and growing
tendency to assume international criminal law is part of the laws of war,
functioning as a kind of subspecies of international humanitarian law (IHL).
1 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court, An Uneasy Resolution,
88 GEO. L.J. 381, 387–88 (2000).
2 See generally id.
3 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Genocide in Syria: International Legal Options, International Legal Limits, and
the Serious Problem of Political Will, 5 IMPUNITY WATCH L.J. 1, 13 (2015).
4 M. Cherif Bassiouni has identified 323 international criminal law instruments elaborated between 1815
and 1996. These instruments deal with topics as broad as crimes against humanity, theft of nuclear materials,
and unlawful use of the mail. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND
THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS (2d rev. ed. 1996).
5 Id.
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This assumption is demonstrably incorrect. Even amongst the three crimes
currently justiciable before the International Criminal Court—genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity6—two are applicable in peacetime, during
which IHL does not apply.7 The genocide convention of 1948 envisages the
possibility of genocide being committed in war or in peace in Article 1 of the
text,8 but genocidal intent is so difficult to establish that it has been rendered
relatively ineffective as a tool of prevention and punishment.9 Not so, however,
for crimes against humanity.
Although prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute, it was not clear whether
crimes against humanity could be committed in peacetime, or whether a nexus
to armed conflict was required,10 this doubt was eliminated by the negotiators of
the Rome Statute, with startling results: As of 2013, thirty percent of the cases
brought at the ICC were “crimes against humanity only” cases, because no
“armed conflict” was in play regarding either the particular crimes at issue or
the situation more generally.11 This is in opposition to 1–2% of the cases brought
at the ad hoc international tribunals.12 This means that the ICC can truly—and
to a significant degree—exercise its jurisdiction in peacetime. This is new, and
has important juridical and normative consequences.
As a legal matter, the fact that crimes against humanity law applies in
peacetime suggests that the legal framework surrounding this crime needs a
divorce—or at least a legal separation—from international humanitarian law.
Although Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as
the commission of certain acts when “committed as part of a widespread or
6 How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works (last visited
Jan. 8, 2017).
7 See What is International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC ADVISORY SERV. ON INT’L HUMANITARIAN L.
(July 2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf. IHL is premised “in its entirety” on a
“subtle equilibrium between two diametrically opposed impulses: military necessity and humanitarian
considerations.” YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 16 (1st ed. 2004). International criminal law, however, has much broader goals, including defining a
wide variety of international offenses and establishing procedures for interstate cooperation regarding their
prevention and prosecution. Id.
8 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, adopted Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
9 See David L. Nersessian, Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International
Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 231, 267 (2002).
10 See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 457–61 (3d ed. 2008); see also Yoram
Dinstein, Crimes Against Humanity After Tadić, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 373, 383–84 (2000).
11 Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 356, 363
(2013).
12 Id. at 356–57.
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systematic attack directed against a civilian population,”13 IHL provisions about
when it is lawful (or not) to attack “civilians” would appear both inapplicable
and confusing during peacetime, during which time every person is a “civilian.”
This Article is the first comprehensive effort to address this conceptual and
juridical problem, proposing an autonomous meaning for the term “civilian
population” in Article 7 that is both supported by and consistent with existing
customary and conventional international law.
Scholars have long debated the meaning and utility of the “civilian
population” requirement.14 Many have observed the difficulties of merely
“transposing” IHL notions onto Article 7,15 offering instead a human rightscentered approach,16 which would be explicitly linked to human rights law and
its protections, which grant positive rights to all individuals regardless of status
or circumstances.17 Others have hypothesized that the “‘civilian’ reference
serves a rational purpose, which is simply to exclude military actions against
legitimate military objectives in accordance with international humanitarian

13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, ¶ 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered
into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, at 108, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, U.N. Sales No. E.03.V.2
(2002) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes].
14 See, e.g., Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 178, 190 (1956). This debate
has continued since the Nuremberg Tribunal was established and issued its judgment. See id.
15 Mario Bettati, Le crime contre l’humanité, in DROIT INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL 115, 115–16 (H. Ascencio,
E. Decaux & A. Pellet eds., 2012) (suggesting a more “nuanced” approach is required in the case law of the ad
hoc international criminal tribunals, and observing that this continues to soulever de redoutables difficultés); see
also, WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE
154 (2010) (taking note of these difficulties and suggesting that “the concept of ‘civilian population’ should be
construed liberally, in order to promote the principles underlying the prohibition of crimes against humanity,
which is to safeguard human values and protect human dignity”).
16 Payam Akhavan, Reconciling Crimes Against Humanity with the Laws of War, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
21, 24–25 (2008).
17 Id. at 27–28; see also, ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 104 (3d ed. 2013) (“if crimes
against humanity may now be committed in time of peace as well, it no longer makes sense to require that such
crimes be perpetrated against the civilian population alone”). The author poses the question, “[w]hy should
members of military forces be excluded, since they in any case would not be protected by [international
humanitarian law] in the absence of any armed conflict?” Id. He wrote:

Plainly, in times of peace military personnel too may become the object of crimes against humanity
at the hands of their own authorities. By the same token, in time of armed hostilities, there is no
longer any reason for excluding servicemen, whether or not hors de combat (wounded, sick, or
prisoners of war), from protection against crimes against humanity (chiefly persecution), whether
committed by their own authorities, by allied forces, or by the enemy.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also, David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L.
85, 93 (2004) (discussing the distinctive purposes behind the inclusion of this crime in the Nuremberg Charter).
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law.”18 Some of the early judgments of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals recognized this possibility, such as the Separate Opinion of Judges
McDonald and Vohrah in Erdemović, which opined that “crimes against
humanity . . . constitute egregious attacks on human dignity [and] consequently
affect . . . each and every member of mankind,”19 regardless of their
circumstance.
As a normative matter, the question arises, what is peacetime? Although
there are many possible definitions of peace,20 for purposes of this Article,
“peacetime” is defined in the negative—as the absence of war, or to put it
another way, as the paradigm governing national and international relations in
the absence of armed conflict.21 The traditional approach of public international
law considers peace as the rule, with special rules regarding armed conflict as
the exception.22 More recently, prominent U.S. scholars have suggested the need
to eliminate the peacetime paradigm in favor of a state of “perpetual war,”23 on
the grounds that this realist approach will lead to greater protections for human
18

ROBERT CRYER, HÅKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION

TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 242 (2d ed. 2010) (emphasis in original).
19 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald

and Judge
Vohrah, ¶ 21 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 7, 1997).
20 Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, defines peace as “[a] state of public tranquility; freedom from
civil disturbance or hostility.” Peace, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1244 (10th ed. 2014). The United Nations, on
the other hand, defines the human right to peace as “life without war.” G.A. Res. A/RES/39/11, annex,
Declaration of the Right of Peoples to Peace (Nov. 12, 1984).
21 See generally STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (2015); Alfred de
Zayas, Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, U.N. Human
Rights Council, Opinion on Occasion of the First Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Right to
Peace (Feb. 14, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12997&LangID=E). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber defined “armed conflict” as existing “whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State.” Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Def. Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction]. The ICC Trial Chamber
has cited this definition, noting that “armed conflict” is not defined in the Rome Statute or the Elements of
Crimes. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,
¶¶ 531–33 (Trial Chamber I Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Trial Judgment].
22 Oppenheim’s classic treatise on international law, divided into two volumes (the first dealing with peace
and the second with war), reflects this distinction. See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings
& Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1996).
23 See Rosa Brooks, There’s No Such Thing as Peacetime, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 13, 2015),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/theres-no-such-thing-as-peacetime-forever-war-terror-civil-liberties/
[hereinafter Brooks, There’s No Such Thing as Peacetime]; see also ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME
WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING (2016); Monika Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining
Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369, 370 (2008).
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rights,24 or a more sensible balance between human rights and the demands of
national security in the “war on terror.”25 Under this view, government actions
involving the use of military force are properly viewed through the lens of IHL,
particularly as regards the legality of targeting, even if those military operations
are carried out in peacetime, outside of armed conflict.
This attempted conceptual re-framing of the international legal order
reinforces the modern tendency to consider international criminal law part of
international humanitarian law. One consequence is that it encourages States to
accord themselves increasing authority to use military force as a response to
terrorist acts. As Naz Modirzadeh has written, this view of a “boundary-less
battlefield” could push IHL rules on targeting to the breaking point, making
everyone, everywhere, liable to be killed as “collateral damage” because it
would be impossible to know if:
relaxing in a café in the capital city of a country apparently at peace,
one is sitting next to someone who has been identified by some State
somewhere as a commander of a terrorist group that poses an imminent
threat, a threat that such a State has determined the territorial
government is unwilling to address.26

This dystopian perspective has been rejected by other scholars, who have
emphasized the fundamental importance of peace as the presumptive framework
for international relations. Hewing to classic understandings of war and peace,
these authors emphasize the existence of a clear “human right to peace,”27 warn

24

Brooks, There’s No Such Thing as Peacetime, supra note 23.
Id. Brooks uses the language “war on terror” in her writings, although the Obama Administration prefers
the moniker “countering violent extremism.” See, e.g., Remarks by President Obama at the Leaders’ Summit on
Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/remarks-president-obama-leaders-summit-countering-isil-and-violent
(transcript of speech given at the U.N. headquarters in New York).
26 Naz Modirzadeh, International Law and Armed Conflict in Dark Times: A Call for Engagement, 96
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 737, 746 (2014). This, of course, is precisely the problem with much of the U.S. drone
strike campaign. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, America’s Drone Wars, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215 (2012);
Kevin Jon Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’: Signature Strikes and International Law, 11 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 89, 119 (2013); Brian J. Egan, Legal Advisor, State Dep’t, Keynote Address at the 110th ASIL Annual
Meeting: International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.
state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm.
27 See, e.g., DOUGLAS ROCHE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PEACE (2003); Anwarul K. Chowdhury,
Human Right to Peace: The Core of the Culture of Peace, in CONTRIBUCIONES REGIONALES PARA UNA
DECLARACIÓN UNIVERSAL DEL DERECHO HUMANO A LA PAZ 125 (Carlos Villán Durán & Carmelo Faleh Pérez
eds., 2010).
25

SADAT GALLEYSPROOFS2

204

2/27/2017 2:39 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

against the consequences of “declar[ing] the world a war zone,”28 and suggest
that the first pillar of an ethical standard of global justice is whether a norm
promotes the advancement of peace.29 As Steven Ratner recently argued in The
Thin Justice of International Law:
War has unparalleled catastrophic consequences for overall human
welfare. More than any other activity over which humans have control,
war undermines the possibility of people to live decent lives. As an
initial matter, its death toll is staggering . . . . War also creates an
atmosphere of havoc, fear, irrationality, and aggressive human
behavior that facilitates the commission of horrible acts against
individuals. Once armies and militias begin fighting, it does not take
long for forcible displacements of populations, sexual assaults, and
other actions against the innocent to begin—actions that many
governments and their opponents would not commit in peacetime.30

Ratner is surely right as an empirical matter; although proposals for a radical
rethinking of the need for “perpetual war” are seductive, they have not
established either empirically or normatively that theirs is the better—or more
acceptable—view. Indeed the notion of “perpetual war” as the appropriate
framework for international relations runs afoul of Article 2(4)’s prohibition on
the use of force in the U.N. Charter,31 often referred to as the “Constitution” of
the international legal order.32 For this reason, this Article, which explores the
understanding of crimes against humanity in peacetime as well as during armed
conflict, adheres to traditional understandings of the demarcation between the
two and the traditional definition of “armed conflict” in international law.33
The fact that crimes against humanity law applies in peacetime and wartime
and the laws of war do not presents an interesting challenge to the interpretation
of the ICC Statute. For crimes against humanity first emerged as a matter of
positive law during World War II, which meant a peacetime understanding of
28 Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Future of Peace, Weapons, and War, ATLANTA COUNCIL ON INT’L REL.
(Nov. 3, 2015), http://atlantacir.org/tfpwwoconnell/; see also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Erring for Peace: Illegal
War, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Law, in SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE
(Leila Nadya Sadat ed., forthcoming 2017).
29 RATNER, supra note 21, at 67.
30 Id.
31 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
32 See, e.g., BARDO FASSBENDER, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2009); David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153 (2016)
(discussing the simultaneous and complementary trends of the “constitutionalization of international law” and
the “internationalization of constitutional law,” and identifying the emergence of a hybrid “universalist” model
of constitutionalism that combines elements of public international law and domestic constitutional law).
33 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 10.
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crimes against humanity law was largely absent from the jurisprudence of the
ad hoc international criminal tribunals, especially the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY).34 Indeed, the ICTY Statute requires a specific connection between the
commission of crimes against humanity and armed conflict.35 Although ICTY
Chambers recognized that the armed conflict requirement was not part of crimes
against humanity’s definition in customary international law,36 and early case
law thus argued for a broad understanding of the “civilian population”
requirement of Article 5,37 over time the Chambers clearly felt more comfortable
relying upon IHL to define the elements of the crimes in its Statute, even crimes
against humanity. As Part I(A)(1) infra explores, this jurisprudence was
followed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which although lacking
an explicit reference to armed conflict in its definition of crimes against
humanity, was also adjudicating war time cases, and was in any event mandated
by its Statute to follow the decisions of the ICTY Appeals Chamber.38 As Part
I(A)(2) infra explores, the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR) and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) recognized the need to develop
an autonomous definition of crimes against humanity but did not actually
produce one.39
Given the silence of the Rome Statute, the lack of a treaty on crimes against
humanity,40 and the absence of any clear customary international law rule
emerging from the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, this remains an open
and difficult interpretive question for judges of the International Criminal Court,
who have been tasked with this question of first impression.
34 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: The Case for a Specialized Convention, 9 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 575, 575 (2010). It is worth observing, however, that the drafters of the Nuremberg
Charter clearly envisaged the possibility that crimes against humanity could take place prior to the onset of war,
as Article 6(c) refers to their occurrence taking place “before or during the war.” See Charter of the International
Military Tribunal art. 6(c), in Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
35 Akhavan, supra note 16, at 22.
36 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Def. Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 21,
¶ 141.
37 See infra Part I.A.1(a) for a discussion of the Tadić decision.
38 S.C. Res. 1315, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 20, ¶ 3, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
39 See infra Parts I.A.1(b) and I.A.3.
40 The movement for a new convention on crimes against humanity has accelerated in recent years. See
FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 30, 36 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011); see also ON
THE PROPOSED CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY CONVENTION (Morten Bergsmo & Song Tianying eds., FICHL
2014); Bassiouni, supra note 34; Summaries of the Work of the International Law Commission—Crimes Against
Humanity, INT’L LAW COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_7.shtml (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
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Thus far, however, ICC judges have largely followed the jurisprudence of
the ICTY without reflecting upon the differences between the definitions of
crimes against humanity in the ICC and ICTY statutes, or even the diverse
jurisprudential solutions of the ICTR and the ECCC. ICC Chambers have held
that the definition of “civilian” set forth in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I
(AP I) to the Geneva Conventions (on the laws of war) sets forth the relevant
test for understanding the meaning of the word “civilian” in Article 7 (on crimes
against humanity).41 Yet this definition is fraught with difficulties, particularly
in two specific aspects: The operation of the “principle of distinction”42 and the
notion of limiting the protections of IHL to “protected persons” who do not share
the nationality of the offender, as defined in the Geneva Conventions.43
This Article proposes a resolution of these conceptual difficulties. It suggests
that the words “any civilian population” in Article 7 have an autonomous
meaning, beginning with the understanding that crimes against humanity as an
international criminal law offense, is decidedly not an offshoot of IHL (if it ever
has been). In other words, it proposes that the ICC puts “peacetime first” in order
to give content to Article 7(1), then move on to its meaning and application
during armed conflict. This means that everyone is a civilian—or a member of
41 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, ¶ 110 (July 29, 2004) [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement].
42 The “principle of distinction” requires that parties to a conflict at all times distinguish between civilians
and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against the latter, and must not be directed against civilians. 1
JEAN MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWOLD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3–4
(ICRC, 2005).
43 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. The International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC)
new commentary to Common Article 3 suggests that its requirement of humane treatment applies to all civilians
and a party’s own armed forces. ICRC Commentary of 2016: Conflicts Not of an International Character, ¶¶ 545,
546, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6C
DFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC#293_B [hereinafter ICRC 2016 Commentary]. The ICC has not yet taken
on board this principle, pref. The ICRC notes that civilians and a party’s own forces are protected by Common
Article 3, because of the provision’s “no adverse distinction,” requirement. Id. It is not clear whether the ICC
will ultimately take this view as in cases like Lubanga, see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Trial Judgment, supra note
21, and Ntaganda, infra notes 49–50, 170, the Prosecutor did not pursue charges on this basis. More recently,
however, in the Dominic Ongwen case, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has alleged (and the Pre-Trial
Chamber has confirmed) charges of crimes against humanity of enslavement, forced marriage, torture, sexual
slavery, rape, and forced pregnancy under Article 7(1) of the Statute. Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Decision
on the Confirmation of the Charges, ¶¶ 110–112 (Pre-Trial Chamber II Mar. 23, 2016). The OTP has also alleged
the war crimes of torture, sexual slavery, rape, and forced pregnancy under Article 8(2)(c) (incorporating the
provisions of Common Article 3) and 8(2)(e) (war crimes in non-international armed conflict) as well as outrages
on personal dignity pursuant to Article 8(2)(c)(iii) of the Statute. Id. ¶¶ 110–112, 117. The confirmation of these
charges by the Pre-Trial Chamber suggests that the ICC may be moving in the direction suggested by this Article
and the 2016 ICRC new commentary to Common Article 3.
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a civilian population—if they cannot lawfully be the subject of an attack
involving or potentially involving their loss of life. They are thus protected by
the human right to life.44 The Court should therefore look not only to a victim’s
(or victim population’s) formal status (as civilian within the meaning of IHL)
but the actual situation of the individual or population targeted for abuse, as well
as assess whether the “attack” takes place in peacetime or during armed conflict,
whether International Armed Conflict (IAC) or Non-International Armed
Conflict (NIAC). As a practical matter, this will eliminate the operation of the
principle of distinction in peacetime, and abolish the artificial divide between
protected and non-protected persons during war and peace.
This methodology is admittedly more complex than the ICC Chambers’
current approach. However, this nuanced interpretation of the ICC Statute is
justified—and even required—by looking to the object and purpose of the ICC
Statute, as well as the drafting history of the text.45 During the Statute’s
negotiation, many delegations proposed deleting the word “civilian” as
confusing and unnecessary.46 It was retained, but without definition, because the
negotiators felt that the definition of civilian population, in particular, was “too
complex a subject and an evolving area in the law, better left for resolution in
case-law.”47 Thus they were aware that this complexity existed as a function of
the three scenarios presented by the situations referred to the Court (peacetime,
NIAC and IAC) and their separate evolution in customary international law and
treaties, but were unsure how to resolve the difficulty as a drafting matter.
A nuanced approach also has the advantage of aligning the provisions of
Articles 7 and 8 in cases of crimes against humanity committed during armed
44 See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7. This Article focuses on the human right to life as protected by
the ICC Statute; however, the principles applicable to this right apply equally to the rights enshrined in the other
crimes listed in Article 7(1).
45 See, e.g., GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JEßBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
¶ 888 (3d ed. 2014); see also Kai Ambos, Crimes Against Humanity and the ICC, in FORGING A CONVENTION
FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 279, 279, 283 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2d. ed. 2013); Kai Ambos, Selected
Issues Regarding the “Core Crimes” in International Criminal Law, in 19 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
QUO VADIS? 219, 245, 257 (Nouvelles Études Pénales, 2004); KAI AMBOS, INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT.
STRAFANWENDUNGSRECHT, VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT UND EUROPÄISCHES STRAFRECHT, marginal numbers ¶¶ 189
et seq. (3d ed. 2011).
46 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10, ¶ 176 (1991); Int’l
Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, ¶ 50 (1996). It is worth nothing
that the International Law Commission deleted it from both its 1991 and 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. Id. See generally Kai Ambos & Steffen Wirth, The Current Law of Crimes
Against Humanity: An Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000, 13 CRIM. L.F. 1, 7 (2002).
47 Darryl Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 57, 78 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).
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conflict, but recognizes the autonomous nature of crimes against humanity when
committed in peacetime.48 Moreover, it will have the advantage of filling gaps
in the application of Article 7 that makes its operation seem otherwise arbitrary
or uncertain.
Two examples may be useful in this regard. In many non-international armed
conflicts, rebel organized armed groups attack villages and abduct or conscript
men and women, boys and girls, into their forces.49 Some of those abducted are
forced to fight; if under the age of 15, they are protected by the laws of war,
which forbid the enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers, and may also
be protected from rape and sexual abuse as children.50 But if fifteen or older,
under the traditional view they lost the protection of the laws of war once taken
into an organized armed group, because the laws of war do not protect attacks
48 The careful reader will observe that this Article focuses upon one specific crime against humanity,
murder, under Article 7(1)(a). In such case, the alignment of IHL with crimes against humanity law during armed
conflict makes sense as the question becomes “who may lawfully be the object of attack.” With respect to other
crimes under Article 7, such as persecutions and apartheid, for example, the alignment of crimes against
humanity law with war crimes law may become less and less important, and even inappropriate. For example,
genocide does not have a “civilian population requirement” meaning that it might be unlawful under the crime
of genocide to attack a military unit (because one intended to exterminate them on racial grounds) even though
under IHL the target might be permissible. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 6. Perhaps this should also be
the rule for the crime against humanity of persecution? This Article does not attempt to resolve all the possible
conflicts and relationships between IHL and Article 7 of the Rome Statute, but establishes a general framework
to undertake a specific analysis in each case.
49 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-458-AnxA, Updated Document Containing
the Charges, ¶¶ 4, 100–08 (Counts 6, 9, 14, 15 &16) (Pre-Trial Chamber II Feb. 16, 2015).
50 This appears to be the view taken in the Ntaganda case, in which Bosco Ntaganda, a former military
commander and Deputy Chief of Staff of the UPC/FPLC, a militia operating in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, is currently awaiting trial at the ICC. Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-458-AnxA,
Updated Document Containing the Charges, ¶¶ 4, 100–08 (Counts 6, 9, 14, 15 &16) (Pre-Trial Chamber II Feb.
16, 2015). He has been charged with conscription, enlistment and use of children under the age of fifteen to
participate actively in hostilities, under Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute, as well as subjecting them to
rape and sexual slavery, also charged as war crimes under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute. Id. The charges also
include rape and sexual slavery of civilians as a crime against humanity (and a war crime) in counts 4, 5, 7, and
8. Id. However, according to the Document Containing the Charges, these charges relate to activities of the
militia during their attacks on the villages set forth in paragraphs 67, 71, 72, 74, 77, 79, 84, and 89 of the DCC,
not to the acts of Ntaganda and his militia after abducting the individuals in question into his forces. Id. Although
there are still many gaps in the protection of the Statute as evidenced by the fact that individuals fifteen and older
who are taken into or by the militias remain unprotected under both Articles 8 and 7 of the Rome Statute, the
charging document has nonetheless been lauded by the Prosecutor’s Special Advisor for Gender Based Crimes
for the “broader approach to gender-based crimes . . . and . . . much more advanced conceptualization of these
crimes by the ICC than in their earlier case against Thomas Lubanga.” Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC
Commencement of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing: The Prosecutor vs. Bosco Ntaganda, (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Ntaganda-Press-Statement-February-2014.pdf (quoting Brigid Inder,
Executive Director of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice and Special Advisor to ICC Prosecutor Fatou
Bensouda).
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upon individuals in one group being victimized by individuals from the same
group51—hence the need for the creation of crimes against humanity as a
category of crimes in 1945.
But what if those individuals either do not become fighters at all, or when
not “directly participating in hostilities,” are tortured, subjected to sexual or
gender-based violence, or are otherwise mistreated, as was alleged (but not
charged) in the Lubanga case decided in 2012?52 If they have lost their “civilian”
status, and no longer form part of a “civilian population” it would appear that
they are not protected under Article 7—crimes against humanity—because as a
formal matter, IHL no longer considers them civilians.53 Were the ICC to take
this position—that it is the formal status of the individuals abducted and “taken
in” to the rebel forces that matters, as opposed to the context—what they are
actually enduring—those individuals who are suffering terrible harm will
receive no protection at all from the Court under either Article 8 (war crimes) or
Article 7 (crimes against humanity). This suggests that adopting the Article 50
definition of civilian that rests upon formal status in an international armed
conflict54 to determine the test for who can be the victim of a crime against
humanity during a non-international armed conflict, or even in peacetime, is not
appropriate, and indeed, in the most recent case confirmed at the court,
Prosecutor v. Ongwen, both the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber appear to
agree, having confirmed charges of sexual violence, torture, and outrages upon
personal dignity as both war crimes and crimes against humanity against women
and girls abducted and taken by Ongwen’s troops.55 This would appear to be the
51 See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8. Common Article 3—unlike the grave breaches regime of the
Geneva Conventions—could be read as protecting such individuals, but at least in current practice at the ICC,
the OTP has not charged individuals with such crimes under Article 8 of the Statute.
52 The ICC’s OTP was heavily criticized by scholars and civil society alike for failing to bring genderbased and sexual violence charges against Lubanga Dyilo. See, e.g., K’Shaani O’Smith, Prosecutor v. Lubanga:
How the International Criminal Court Failed the Women and Girls of Congo, 54 HOW. L.J. 467, 468–69 (2011);
Joint Letter from Avocats Sans Frontiers et al. to Luis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal
Court (July 31, 2006), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DRC_joint_letter_eng.pdf.
53 The Special Court for Sierra Leone has held that the “forced marriage” of both women and girls by
organized armed groups constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 7. See Prosecutor v. Brima et al.
(The AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 175–203 (Appeals Chamber Feb. 22, 2008)
(overturning the findings of Trial Chamber II that “forced marriage” was subsumed by the “sexual slavery”
charge, but declining to enter fresh convictions); Prosecutor v. Sesay (The RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1291–97 (Trial Chamber Mar. 2, 2009) (entering convictions for “forced marriage” as a crime
against humanity for the first time).
54 See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 50.
55 See supra note 43. It is unclear whether this is because the women and girls in those cases are clearly
not part of the fighting forces, and therefore never “lost” their civilian status, which seems to be the case on the
facts, or because OTP and/or the Pre-Trial Chamber is relying upon a broad understanding of the term civilian
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right result, certainly as regards the charges of crimes against humanity which
are the subject of this Article—after all, the raison d’ȇtre of including crimes
against humanity as a category of offenses at Nuremberg was to protect
individuals attacked by the Nazi regime—such as German Jews—who were not
otherwise protected by the laws of war.56
A second example may be helpful as well. Suppose that a country’s leader
ruthlessly suppresses all political opposition, subjecting individuals suspected of
dissent to torture, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, enslavement, or
even death. The North Korean example comes to mind.57 The crimes committed
aim not only at “civilians” (in the IHL sense of the term) but members of the
armed forces as well, who are subject to successive purges that often involve the
commission of Article 7 crimes. There is simply no reason why the membership
of an individual in the armed forces—or the police—should deprive them of
Article 7’s protective mantle simply by virtue of their rank or formal status.
Rather, they are clearly “civilians” for purposes of Article 7.58
The ECCC faced this question, and decided that although members of the
armed forces were not “civilians” they could nonetheless be the victims of a
crime against humanity.59 This work-around solution, which was also the
solution adopted by the Yugoslavia Tribunal, had the benefit of providing all the
victims of the Pol Pot regime with legal protection, but seems less satisfactory
than simply understanding that the word “civilian” during peacetime includes
everyone, for it requires others to be attacked first to establish the “attack against

along the lines suggested by this Article or even the new ICRC Commentary on Common Article 3. This is
obviously an issue that will be more fully examined as the case proceeds.
56 See generally Katie A. Welgan, The Nuremberg Trials and Crimes Against Humanity, YOUNG
HISTORIANS CONF. (2014), http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=
younghistorians.
57 See Jeong Kwang-il, ‘There Are Two Legal Ways to Kill Prisoners’ – Life in North Korea’s Yodok Prison
Camp, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2014, 5:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/16/north-koreayodok-prison-camp. The worrisome trend in Turkey also comes to mind. See Josh Keller et al., The Scale of
Turkey’s Purge Is Nearly Unprecedented, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/08/02/world/europe/turkey-purge-erdogan-scale.html?_r=0. As of early August 2016, 10,012
Turkish soldiers had been detained, the equivalent of taking nearly one in sixty members of the U.S. military
into custody. Id; see also Samia Nakhoul et al., Erdogan Says Turkey’s Military to Be Restructured After
Abortive Coup, REUTERS (July 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/Article/us-turkey-security-erdoganidUSKCN1012TD.
58 For a discussion of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea see infra Part II.C.4(b).
59 See Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶¶ 322,
325 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Case 001, Judgement].
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the civilian population,” before the armed forces or the police can receive the
protection of Article 7.60
It would be possible for the ICC to take the view that Article 7 is completely
autonomous from Article 8, and eliminate the word “civilian” from Article 7 of
the Statute as a legal element entirely, but this approach raises significant
difficulties. Clearly a majority of delegations in Rome thought that it was
important to include the modifier “civilian” before “population” for consistency
with prior instruments; and the ad hoc Tribunals developed an extensive
jurisprudence regarding it, law that was applied to more than two hundred
accused in cases decided by those courts. It could therefore unduly fragment
international criminal law to set aside this jurisprudence entirely, and, as a
normative matter, could have the effect of rendering military operations that are
lawful under Article 8 potentially unlawful under Article 7. This result does not
appear to be mandated by the Statute, and could work unfair prejudice to the
accused.61
This Article is the first comprehensive treatment of this question. Part I
explores the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals on this
issue. Part II briefly discusses the early jurisprudence of the ICC and then
suggests a methodological approach for addressing this open-ended question in
the ICC Statute, applying my Seven Canons of ICC treaty interpretation to the
question at issue.62 Finally, the Conclusion asserts that the proper solution
involves a three-part test: First, the situation is categorized depending upon
whether or not it involves crimes committed during or outside of armed conflict.
If the crimes have been committed during peacetime, all individuals are
presumptively civilians, and are part of the “population” protected by Article 7,
even members of the armed forces and the police other than those actually
perpetrating the attacks.
Second, if the crimes have been committed during an armed conflict, the
Court must then consider whether the conflict is international or non-

60

See id.
Rogier Bartels, Two Cheers for the ICTY Popovic et al. Appeals Judgment: Some Words on the Interplay
Between IHL and ICL, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/two-cheers-for-the-icty-popovic-etal-appeals-judgement-some-words-on-the-interplay-between-ihl-and-icl/.
62 See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & Jarrod M. Jolly, Seven Canons of ICC Treaty Interpretation: Making
Sense of Article 25’s Rorschach Blot, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 755 (2014).
61
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international in nature, which brings IHL in as a lex specialis,63 as a “technique
for the resolution of normative conflicts.”64 Under traditional understandings of
humanitarian law, civilians in non-international armed conflict are those not
“directly participating in hostilities;”65 and during international armed conflict,
they are indeed defined in Article 50 of Protocol I, as those not entitled to
prisoner of war (POW) status under the Third Geneva Convention.66 In either
case, the targeted victim population’s formal status is assessed under the relevant
provisions of international humanitarian law. However, the inquiry does not stop
there.
Finally, rather than mechanically transferring rules of IHL to Article 7, the
Court must assess the specific situation of the victims, in context. In practical
terms, this means that the soldiers “attacked” by their own regime are part of the
“civilian population” protected by the law of crimes against humanity because
the provisions of IHL that do not protect individuals from attacks by their own
nationals should not apply to the application of Article 7 of the Rome Statute in
peacetime or wartime. This is also true for the individuals allegedly abducted
and cruelly mistreated by rebel organized armed groups who do not “lose” their
civilian status when taken into an armed group, except during and to the extent
that they are actually directly participating in hostilities. In this case they may
be made the object of attack under Protocol II, but are still protected from cruel
treatment and various forms of criminal abuse by their captors under Article 7.
This is a common sense result, and one that, interestingly, the International
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) appears to be now embracing for IHL as a
matter of customary international law as well.67 To take a domestic example, if

63 The legal maxim ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ requires that law governing specific factual matters
must override law that governs only general factual matters when those two laws conflict. See Dorota Marianna
Banaszewska, Lex Specialis, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L., at MPEPIL 2171 (2015).
64 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, finalized by Chairman Martii
Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion
of International Law, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Koskenniemi Report].
65 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13, ¶ 3, adopted June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; NILS MELZER, ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 27 (ICRC,
2009) [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]; S. Bosch, The International Humanitarian Law Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities—A Review of the ICRC Interpretive Guide and the Subsequent Debate, 17
POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 998, 999 (2014).
66 See infra Part I.A.1(a).; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A),
adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
67 ICRC 2016 Commentary, supra note 43. The ICRC appears to agree that individuals in armed forces are
protected at least from inhumane treatment by their own troops under Common Article 3. Whether the ICC will
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a group of terrorists abduct and hold a group of persons for ransom, the hostages
have not become part of the terrorist gang and liable for their crimes simply by
virtue of their abduction; for that to happen, they would have to actively support
the terrorist group and undertake violent actions on their behalf. And even then,
they would have a defense as to whether they were acting under compulsion.
Although this three-part test is more complex than cutting and pasting
language found in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions into Article
7 of the ICC Statute, its adoption could enhance the expressive function of the
ICC Statute by making it clear that the definition of civilian population in Article
7 is premised, in the first instance, not upon the formal rules of international
humanitarian law, but upon a peacetime understanding of the crime that takes
into account the actual situation of the victim population. It also squares with
our common sense understanding, underscored by the examples given above,
about who is deserving of Rome Statute protection, and it avoids creating gaps
in the Statute’s protective mantle. Finally, as this Article explains, this
complexity is inherent in the international legal order in which the Rome Statute
is embedded. It does not arise from an artificial or strained reading of the Statute
but is a natural consequence of the manner in which international law has
developed over time.
I. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION REQUIREMENT BY
THE AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
It was not until the establishment of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals that a substantial jurisprudence developed regarding the meaning of the
term “civilian population” in the contextual elements of crimes against
humanity. This Part considers the development of that jurisprudence and
considers its potential contribution to customary international law, a question
also taken up again in Part II(C)(4)(b), infra.

adopt this view, given the codification of its Statute in 1998 when the law was different, remains to be seen and
is beyond the scope of this Article.
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A. The Civilian Population Requirement in Armed Conflict
1. The Narrowing Interpretations of the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
a. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Under Article 5 of its Statute, the ICTY has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes
against humanity “when committed in armed conflict” and “directed against any
civilian population.”68 Given this explicit connection between crimes against
humanity and armed conflict in the ICTY Statute, it is not surprising that the
Tribunal turned to IHL to define the elements of Article 5, although early cases
admitted the difficulties involved in doing so.
In its first judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadić, issued one year prior to the Rome
Statute’s adoption, the Tribunal observed that the IHL definition of civilian “is
not immediately applicable to crimes against humanity because it is a part of the
laws or customs of war and can only be applied by analogy,”69 and noted that
authorities were not uniform on the meaning of civilian status.70 It therefore
suggested that “a broad definition of the term ‘civilian’”71 was appropriate, as
IHL reflected “elementary considerations of humanity.”72
Three years later, the Tribunal concluded that “those actively involved in a
resistance movement can qualify as victims of crimes against humanity.”73 In
reaching this conclusion, the Trial Chamber observed:

68 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5, S.C. Res. 827, annex,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
69 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, ¶ 639 (May 7, 1997) [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgement]. The Trial Chamber made reference to Common Article 3 because it
believed the conflict to be non-international in nature. Id.
70 Id. ¶ 640 (see internal citations) (contrasting the U.N. War Crimes Commission position that civilians
are not members of the armed forces, with the ruling of the Supreme Court of the British zone that crimes against
humanity are applicable in all cases in which the perpetrator and the victim shared the same nationality,
regardless of whether the victim was civilian or military).
71 Id. ¶ 626.
72 Id. ¶ 639 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Def. Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
supra note 21, ¶¶ 102–03).
73 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, et al. (The “Lašva Valley” Case), Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 540 (Jan.
14, 2000). It should be noted that this case was not published at the time the Switzerland commentary was
submitted to the Working Group on the Elements of Crimes. See generally id.; Commentary submitted by Switz.
on Art. 7 of the Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court, submitted at the Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal
Court, Working Group on Elements of Crimes, New York, 16–26 Feb., 26 July–12 Aug., 29 Nov.–17 Dec. 1999,
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/3rdSesProposalArticle7.pdf [hereinafter Switzerland Commentary].
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It would seem that a wide definition of “civilian” and “population” is
intended. This is warranted first of all by the object and purpose of the
general principles and rules of humanitarian law, in particular by the
rules prohibiting crimes against humanity. The latter are intended to
safeguard basic human values by banning atrocities directed against
human dignity. One fails to see why only civilians and not also
combatants should be protected by these rules (in particular by the
rule prohibiting persecution), given that these rules may be held to
possess a broader humanitarian scope and purpose than those
prohibiting war crimes. However, faced with the explicit limitation
laid down in Article 5, the Trial Chamber holds that a broad
interpretation should nevertheless be placed on the word “civilians,”
the more so because the limitation in Article 5 constitutes a departure
from customary international law.74

A few months later, in the Blaškić case, Trial Chamber I again interpreted
the notion of civilian population “broadly,”75 concluding:
Crimes against humanity therefore do not mean only acts committed
against civilians in the strict sense of the term but include also crimes
against two categories of people: those who were members of a
resistance movement and former combatants—regardless of whether
they wore wear [sic] uniform or not—but who were no longer taking
part in hostilities when the crimes were perpetrated because they had
either left the army or were no longer bearing arms, or ultimately had
been placed hors de combat . . . . It also follows that the specific
situation of the victim at the moment the crimes were committed, rather
than his status, must be taken into account in determining his standing
as a civilian.76

This was partially reversed on appeal.
74 Id. ¶ 547 (emphasis added). In the Kunarac case, which followed Tadić, the ICTY casually noted that
the civilian population requirement can be understood by looking at “all persons who are civilians as opposed
to members of the armed forces and other legitimate combatants,” citing by way of passing a commentary to
both AP I and AP II without distinction. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Judgement, ¶ 425 (Trial Chamber Feb. 22, 2001) (citing ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 611, 1451–52 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987))
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Trial Judgement]. Both the Trial Chambers in Kunarac and Tadić proceeded
on the basis that the crimes against humanity alleged to have been committed took place in the context of a noninternational armed conflict. See id.; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra note 69.
75 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 209–10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgement].
76 Id. ¶ 214 (emphasis added). The holding relied upon the Final Report of the Commission of Experts,
chaired by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, which had investigated the Bosnian War. Final Rep. of the Comm. of
Experts Established Pursuant to Sec. Council Res. 780 (1992), transmitted by Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from
the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 78, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
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By July 2004, when the Blaškić Appeals Judgment was handed down,77 the
Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal had begun moving towards a law of war
understanding of crimes against humanity, although the ICTY had not yet
decided to rely upon Article 50 of AP I as the relevant text. It relied upon a 2002
Appeals Chamber ruling in the Kunarac78 case, which asserted “[t]o the extent
that the alleged crimes against humanity were committed in the course of an
armed conflict, the laws of war provide a benchmark against which the Chamber
may assess the nature of the attack and the legality of the acts committed in its
midst.”79 The judgment has no other reference to humanitarian law in discussion
of the Chapeau elements for crimes against humanity, and carefully notes that
the “attack” for purposes of Article 5 (on crimes against humanity) need not be
a military attack,80 and may precede, coincide or even outlast the military
attack.81
Nonetheless, in 2003 the ICTY Appeals Chamber accepted the invitation to
make further reference to the laws of war.82 It concluded, for the first time, that
in the context of an international armed conflict, it was appropriate to use Article
50 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to define the
notion of “civilians” and “civilian populations” as a matter of customary
international law, not only for Articles 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute (war crimes)
but for Article 5 (crimes against humanity) as well.83 Article 50 provides:
Article 50: Definition of Civilians and Civilian Population

77

1.

A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the
categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6)
of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case
of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be
considered to be a civilian.

2.

The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.

See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 41.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement (June 12, 2002) [hereinafter Prosecutor
v. Kunarac, Appeals Judgement].
79 Id. ¶ 91.
80 Id. ¶ 86 (stating that an “attack” encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population).
81 Id.
82 It is not obvious why this shift in ICTY jurisprudence occurred. There were changes in personnel during
this time, which could potentially account for the differences, including Judge Theodor Meron’s election as
President in 2003, as he is known as a “strict constructionist.” See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza
and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron (Nov. 28, 2007).
At the same time, it may be that the shift occurred for other reasons.
83 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 41.
78
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The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do
not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the
population of its civilian character.84

Article 4 A of the Third Geneva Convention, referred to in Article 50
provides, in relevant part:
Article 4: Prisoners of War
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well
as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of
such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided
that such militias or volunteers corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.
....
(6) Inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of
the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading
forces, without having had time to form themselves into
84 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 50, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I].
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regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and
respect the laws and customs of war.85

The combination of Article 50 and Article 4 results in a negative definition
of “civilian;” it becomes, for the purposes of the Geneva Conventions, a subset
of individuals who do not belong to fighting forces entitled to POW treatment
under the Third Geneva Convention. Relying upon these texts, the Appeals
Chamber in Blaškić characterized the Trial Chamber’s view that the specific
situation of the victim at the time the crimes were committed must be taken into
account in determining his standing as a civilian as potentially “misleading.”86
Instead, the Chamber concluded that, read together, “Article 50 of Additional
Protocol I and Article 4 A of the Third Geneva Convention establish that
members of the armed forces, and members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of such armed forces, cannot claim civilian status.”87
The Blaškić Appeals Chamber’s decision on this question is anything but
comprehensive. It simply imports the definition of “civilian” applicable in
international armed conflict (via Protocol I) into Article 5 of the ICTY Statute
(on crimes against humanity) without any explanation other than the fact that
these provisions “constitute . . . the core of the customary law applicable in
international armed conflicts.”88 Although the decision is short and relatively
opaque, it has had great “stickiness” influencing not only subsequent cases at
the ICTY and the other ad hoc tribunals, but the early case law of the ICC.
Indeed, it is probably the judgment most cited on this question,89 serving as
85

Third Geneva Convention, supra note 66.
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 41, ¶ 114. The Appeals Chamber did not say
erroneous, which compounds the confusion. Id. It concluded that:
86

the specific situation of the victim at the time the crimes are committed may not be determinative
of his civilian or non-civilian status. If he is indeed a member of an armed organization, the fact
that he is not armed or in combat at the time of the commission of crimes, does not accord him
civilian status.
Id.

87 Id. ¶ 113; see also Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 50 (Nov. 12, 2009)
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Milošević, Appeals Judgement] (“[T]he term ‘civilian population’ generally refers to
a population that is predominantly civilian . . . [and] the civilian status of the population ‘may change due to the
flow of civilians and combatants.’”). Accord, Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment,
¶ 180 (Trial Chamber Feb. 26, 2001) (adopting a “wide definition of what constitutes a civilian population”).
88 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 41, ¶ 113.
89 See, e.g., Case 001, Judgement, supra note 59, ¶ 304; Prosecutor v. Chea, Case No. 002/19-092007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, ¶¶ 184–86 (Aug. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Case 002, Judgement] (noting the approach
taken by the Blaškić Appeals Chamber but declining to follow it); Prosecutor v. Fofana (The CDF Case), Case
No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 116 (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Fofana Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Fofana,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 258–59 (May 28, 2008); Prosecutor v. Sesay (The RUF Case), Case No.
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precedent not only for other cases at the ICTY but at other international criminal
courts and tribunals, including the ICC.
This definition created conceptual difficulties for the ICTY including gaps
in protection that were problematic for the Tribunal, such as the question of
whether persons hors de combat can be the victims of crimes against humanity.
As noted earlier, in Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber appeared to overturn part of
the Trial Chamber’s judgment that the definition of civilian population under
crimes against humanity included former combatants and persons no longer
taking part in hostilities when the crimes were perpetrated,90 holding instead that
it is not the specific situation of the victim at the time the crimes are committed
that determines his civilian status, but whether they are “indeed a member of an
armed organization.”91 In Martić, an ICTY Trial Chamber following this lead
held that the term “civilian population” must be narrowly defined,92 declining to
allow persons hors de combat to qualify for civilian status. The Appeals

SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement, ¶ 82 (Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Đorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-A, Judgement,
¶ 522 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 27, 2014); Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90T, Judgement, ¶ 1705 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgement, ¶ 706(c) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27,
2006); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 49(2), 52, 71 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Martić, Trial Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No.
IT-95-11-A, Judgement, ¶ 292 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Martić
Appeals Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Milošević, Appeals Judgement, supra note 87, ¶ 941; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić,
Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 35 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009) [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Appeals Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgement, ¶ 755 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Popović, Trial Judgement];
Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgement, ¶ 146 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 26, 2009) (acknowledging but not directly following the approach taken by the Blaškić Appeals Chamber);
Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgement, ¶ 965 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 30, 2013); Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, ¶ 27 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 27, 2013); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T,
Judgement, ¶ 695 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No.
IT-05-88/2-A, Judgement, ¶ 46 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 8, 2015); Prosecutor v. Bemba,
ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 152 (Mar. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Prosecutor
v. Bemba, Trial Judgment].
90 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgement, supra note 75, ¶ 214.
91 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 41, ¶ 114 (“[T]he specific situation of the victim
at the time the crimes are committed may not be determinative of his civilian or non-civilian status. If he is
indeed a member of an armed organization, the fact that he is not armed or in combat at the time of the
commission of crimes, does not accord him civilian status.”). See also Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No, IT-98-A,
Judgement, ¶ 144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) (noting that the notion of “civilian
population” is expansive, but appearing to suggest that it is the formal status of the victim, not his or her situation
at the time the crimes are committed, that determines his or her civilian status.).
92 Prosecutor v. Martić, Trial Judgement, supra note 89, ¶ 55.

SADAT GALLEYSPROOFS2

220

2/27/2017 2:39 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

Chamber reversed, holding that “nothing in the text of Article 5 . . . require[d]
that individual victims of crimes against humanity . . . be civilians.”93
In Mrkšić, decided two years later, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the
attack on a “civilian population” is jurisdictional in nature,94 meaning that once
established, non-civilians could be the victims of a crime against humanity.
Mrkšić involved the attack on the Vukovar Hospital in Croatia, during which,
among other things, 194 men were removed from the hospital and murdered.95
181 of those killed were known to be members of the Croatian armed forces, but
were hors de combat as they had been detained by Serb forces.96 The Trial
Chamber, looking to the question of the victim’s status as members of the armed
forces, acquitted the accused of crimes against humanity.97 The Appeals
Chamber reversed, finding:
Whereas the civilian status of the victims, the number of civilians, and
the proportion of civilians within a civilian population are factors
relevant to the determination of whether the chapeau requirement of
Article 5 of the Statute that an attack be directed against a “civilian
population” is fulfilled, there is no requirement nor is it an element of
crimes against humanity that the victims of the underlying crimes be
“civilians.”98

Thus, although the ICTY has in recent years clearly aligned its case law on
crimes against humanity with international humanitarian law in defining the
term “civilian population,” it has also taken the approach that once the
jurisdictional element of the attack is fulfilled, all those victimized by a
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population may be victims of a
crime against humanity, regardless of their original status.
The final case worth considering on this point is Popović, a sprawling case
decided relatively recently, involving five accused and charges relating to the
93 Prosecutor v. Martić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 89, ¶ 307; see also Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Appeals
Judgement, supra note 89, ¶ 29.
94 Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 89, ¶ 30–31.
95 Id. ¶ 3.
96 Id. ¶ 36 n.114.
97 Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 83 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Trial Judgement].
98 Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 89, ¶ 32. See generally Hansdeep Singh, Critique
of the Mrkšić Trial Chamber (ICTY) Judgment: A Re-evaluation on Whether Soldiers Hors de Combat Are
Entitled to Recognition as Victims of Crimes Against Humanity, 8 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 247, 248
(2009). The Appeals Chamber nonetheless upheld the acquittals, arguing that the killings were not connected to
the overall attack as they happened subsequent to the attack against the civilian population of Vukovar.
Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 89, ¶¶ 36–43.
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attacks on Srebrenica and Žepa.99 Although the opinion was generally
unremarkable in its discussion of the civilian population requirement from a
doctrinal perspective, some commentators have praised the reliance of the
Appeals Chamber in that case on IHL notions of “civilian” to limit the ambit of
crimes against humanity.100 The Appeals Chamber in Popović found that
although civilians had fled the area at issue in the week prior to the events in
question, there was no evidence that the group of men that were the subject of
the forcible transfer charge included any civilians.101 Because the forced transfer
of enemy soldiers is lawful under IHL, the Appeals Chamber therefore declined
to allow activity that is lawful under IHL to be unlawful under the law of crimes
against humanity, and held that the Trial Chamber had erred in finding that a
widespread and systematic attack had taken place against a civilian
population.102
Due to the complex nature of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which
had a “mixed” character, the ICTY chambers were faced with cases in which
crimes against humanity were committed both in the context of international and
non-international armed conflict. The Trial Chamber in Mrkšić attempted to
reconcile Article 50 of AP I, applicable in international armed conflict, with
situations of non-international armed conflict by equating the term “combatant”
to “fighter” as the contrast to “civilian.”103
The Chamber observed:
The formal status of “combatant” does not apply in non-international
armed conflicts. This does not, however, mean that the principle of
distinction, the cornerstone of international humanitarian law, is not
applicable to non-international armed conflicts. The principle applies,
but is conceptualised in a different manner in non-international armed
conflicts. Whereas the term “civilian” is used for both types of conflict,
the term “fighter” now seems to be the appropriate term to be used as
the equivalent for “combatants” in non-international armed conflict.104

99 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Trial Judgement, supra note 89; Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT05-88-A, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Prosecutor v.
Popović, Appeals Judgement]. The trial involved seven accused. Id. Following the Trial Judgment, one
defendant died and another did not appeal his conviction. Id.
100 See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 61.
101 Prosecutor v. Popović, Appeals Judgement, supra note 99, ¶¶ 773–74.
102 Id. ¶ 774.
103 Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Trial Judgement, supra note 97, ¶ 457.
104 Id.
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It is not clear, however, that this is entirely correct. At least some have suggested
that in the context of non-international armed conflicts, “fighters,” unlike formal
members of the armed forces, may not have the “status” of combatants at all
times and for all purposes, because there is no “combatant” status in NIAC. The
ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
employs the notion of “continuous combat function” to describe individuals for
purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict. The
ICRC study concludes:
In non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute
the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist only
of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in
hostilities (“continuous combat function”).105

As discussed in Part II(C)(4)(a)(iii), Article 50 carefully balances the need for
POW protections for combatants with the need to protect the civilian population
in a given conflict, and was heavily negotiated to strike a balance between them.
In non-international armed conflicts, however, that balance may be quite
different. AP II uses the notion of direct participation in hostilities, although it
may simply be more useful to employ the term “fighter” in both cases to
distinguish both which individuals can be targeted and which individuals have
the “combatant’s privilege,” as the Rwanda Tribunal has suggested.106
b. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
Article 2 of the SCSL Statute addresses crimes against humanity.107 Like the
ECCC, the ICTR, and the Rome Statute, it does not include a reference to armed
conflict, presumably because it was adopted in 2002 after the establishment of
the International Criminal Court. Pursuant to Article 20(3) of its Statute, which
requires the judges of the Appeals Chamber to be “guided by the decisions of
the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and for Rwanda,”108 the SCSL drew much of its crimes against humanity
jurisprudence from ICTY precedents, and for this reason, a detailed study is not
required here.109 In its early jurisprudence, the Court seemed to be inclined
105

ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 36.
I am indebted to Professor Laurie Blank for this insight.
107 SCSL Statute, supra note 38, art. 2.
108 Id. art. 20, ¶ 3.
109 Id. The SCSL found that the armed conflict in that country was a “complex civil war” (NIAC). See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement, ¶ 19 (May 18, 2012) [hereinafter Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Trial Judgement]. The SCSL also found that “the Statute was drawn up with an internal armed conflict
in mind.” See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion on
106
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towards a broad definition, but retreated from it in the face of ICTY precedent.
Thus, in the Brima case, the Court asserted the need for a broad definition of the
term “civilian population” that would encompass not only those who have taken
no active part in hostilities, but those who are no longer doing so, including
members of the armed forces who laid down their arms and persons placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other reason.110 Nonetheless,
the Court concluded that the Blaškić and Galić cases required the term to be
“narrowly defined,” so as to exclude soldiers hors de combat either through
surrender, sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.111
Trial Chamber II in the Taylor case narrowed the definition even further. Of
note, the Defense and the Prosecution had both agreed to the following definition
of civilian:
The terms “civilian” and “civilian population” throughout the
Indictment refer to “persons who took no active part in the hostilities,
or who were no longer taking an active part in the hostilities, including
combatants rendered hors de combat by virtue of injury or wounds,
capture or surrender.”112

The Trial Chamber disagreed, finding this definition to be “overly broad and
inconsistent with customary international law,” referring to IHL and ICTY case
law.113 Instead, the Trial Chamber suggested that a humanitarian law definition
was required to “ensure a distinction in an armed conflict between civilians and
combatants no longer participating in hostilities.”114 The Chamber concluded
that “this distinction is particularly important in a case where the Prosecution
alleges that crimes against humanity were committed in a situation of armed
conflict.”115

Lack of Jurisdiction Materiae: Nature of the Armed Conflict, ¶ 18 (May 25, 2004). The decision held that the
provisions of Common Article 3 and AP II would apply regardless of whether the conflict was international or
non-international in nature, as they are “mandatory minimum rules.” Id. ¶¶ 19, 26, 30.
110 Prosecutor v. Brima et al. (The AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 216 (June 20, 2007).
111 Id. ¶ 219.
112 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Trial Judgement, supra note 109, ¶ 508.
113 Id.
114 Id. ¶ 510.
115 Id.
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2. Broader but Less Influential: The Jurisprudence of the Rwanda Tribunal
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
a. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals share a common Appeals Chamber
but different statutory definitions of crimes against humanity. Article 3 of the
ICTR Statute116 has no armed conflict requirement, and thus more closely
resembles customary international law—and the Rome Statute—than the
parallel provision at the ICTY.117 The Rwanda Tribunal immediately recognized
that the meaning of the term “civilian population” might be different in a NIAC
because it is regulated by Common Article 3 and Protocol II rather than
Protocol I.118 Thus in Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, the Trial Chamber
observed:
Members of the civilian population are people who are not taking any
active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces
who laid down their arms and those persons placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause. Where there are certain
individuals within the civilian population who do not come within the
definition of civilians, this does not deprive the population of its
civilian character.119

In a footnote, the Chamber stated that this definition drew upon Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions.120 This definition has been routinely cited at the
ICTR,121 and was picked up during the Preparatory Commission discussions as
evidenced by its inclusion in Switzerland’s Commentary on Article 7,122
discussed in Part II(C)(3).
116 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, S.C. Res. 99, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
117 See ICTY Statute, supra note 68, art. 5.
118 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 66, art. 3.
119 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 582 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Judgement] (internal citations omitted).
120 Id. ¶ 582 n.146.
121 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR 00-60-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 48, (Apr. 13,
2006) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Trial Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR 200166-I, Judgement, ¶ 358 (Dec. 13, 2006); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-T, Judgement and
Sentence, ¶ 513 (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Trial Judgement]; Prosecutor v.
Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR 99-54A-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 667 (Jan. 22, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli,
Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 873–74 (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No.
ICTR 96-13-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 207 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 72 (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Judgement].
122 See Switzerland Commentary, supra note 73.
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Like the ICTY, and despite its formal inapplicability to non-international
armed conflict, the ICTR, in its jurisprudence, also relies upon Protocol I in
defining “civilian population” although it generally does so in connection with
exploring the war crimes provisions of the ICTR Statute, not the crimes against
humanity provisions of the text.
Thus the Kayishema case referenced Article 50 of AP I and concluded that
civilians are those who do not fall into the “categories of persons referred to in
Articles 4(A)(1), (2), (3), and (6) of the Third Convention and Article 43 of
[Protocol I],” all of whom are types of “combatants.”123 This holding was
incorporated into subsequent cases like Rutaganda, which, relying upon
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, defined the civilian population
for purposes of crimes against humanity as “people who were not taking any
active part in the hostilities.”124 Even when discussing the meaning of “civilian”
in the context of war crimes, the Rutaganda court found that Common Article
3(1) affords protection to “persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat,” language picked up in Article 4 of Additional Protocol
II.125
The Trial Chamber stated that to take a “direct” part in hostilities “means
acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to
the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces,” and went on to
distinguish “civilians” not from “combatants” or “fighters,” but from
“perpetrators.”126 It reasoned, “there is no concise definition of ‘civilian’ in the
Protocols,”127 so, “a definition has evolved through a process of elimination,
whereby the civilian population is made up of persons who are not combatants
or persons placed hors de combat, in other words, who are not members of the
armed forces.”128 The Chamber concluded that “a ‘civilian’ is anyone who falls
outside the category of ‘perpetrator’”129 and with “[t]he class of civilians thus

123 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, ¶ 179 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Judgement]. The Kayishema case was one of the first cases to explicitly
acknowledge the fact that crimes against humanity could be committed in times of “relative peace,” as noted in
Part I.B infra. Id. ¶ 127. The Trial Chamber held “[i]t is generally known that the civilian population is unarmed
and is not in any way drawn into the armed conflict.” Id. ¶ 181.
124 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Judgement, supra note 121, ¶ 72.
125 Id. ¶ 99 (emphasis added).
126 Id. ¶ 100–01.
127 Id. ¶ 100.
128 Id. (emphasis added).
129 Id. ¶ 101.
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broadly defined, it will be a matter of evidence on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether a victim has the status of civilian.”130
Several ICTR cases cite the holding of the Blaškić Trial Chamber Judgment
that “the specific situation of the victim at the moment the crimes were
committed, rather than his status, must be taken into account in determining his
standing as a civilian.”131 This is so even after the case was partially overturned
on appeal,132 with some ICTR Trial Chambers continuing to opine that “the
specific situation of the victim at the moment the crimes were committed, rather
than his status”133 is the relevant test.134
b. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
The ECCC has generally taken the view that the crimes committed by the
Khmer Rouge took place during or were associated with an international armed
conflict.135 However, like the ICTR Statute, Article 5 (on crimes against
humanity) of the ECCC Law does not require a nexus to armed conflict.136 Thus
it is perhaps unsurprising that the ECCC takes a broader approach than the ICTY
on this question, perhaps even more so because there was not the kind of
connection between the international nature of the armed conflict and the
130

Id.
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgement, supra note 75, ¶ 214; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Trial
Judgement, supra note 121, ¶ 49.
132 See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 41, ¶ 115.
133 Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Trial Judgement, supra note 121, ¶ 513 (citing Prosecutor v. Ignace
Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 79 (June 7, 2001) (citing Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial
Judgement, supra note 75, ¶ 214). The Trial Chamber found Muvunyi not guilty of the crimes against humanity
charge of rape. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Trial Judgement, supra note 121, ¶ 531. The conviction for crimes against
humanity for other inhumane acts was overturned on appeal. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55AA, Judgment, ¶ 158 (Aug. 29, 2008). Neither of those decisions addressed this broad understanding of the civilian
population requirement.
134 Like Martić, the ICTR held in Ndindiliyimana that a person “hors de combat may be the victim of an
act amounting to a crime against humanity, provided that all other necessary conditions are met, in particular
that the act in question is part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.” Prosecutor
v. Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 2095, n.3804 (May 17, 2011). These
findings were not disturbed on appeal, although the Appeals Chamber did reverse several of the convictions
entered by the Trial Chamber. See Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-A, Judgement, ¶ 449
(Feb. 11, 2014).
135 Case 001, Judgement, supra note 59, ¶ 322.
136 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 5, ECCC Doc. No. NS/RKM/1004/006),
(as amended 27 Oct. 2004), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_Law_as_amended_
27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf. The chapeau of Article 5 provides: “Crimes against humanity, which have no statute of
limitations, are any acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds . . . .” Id.
131
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atrocity crimes committed in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime,137
whereas the crimes against humanity allegations before the ICTY were explicitly
linked to the excesses of war.138
The Trial Chamber in the Court’s first case, Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch
(Duch), relied on Article 50 of AP I and Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva
Convention to define civilians as “all persons who are not members of the armed
forces or otherwise recognized as combatants,”139 and differentiated them from
those who cannot claim civilian status as “members of the armed forces and
other combatants (militias, volunteer corps and members of organized resistance
groups).”140 The Duch case drew heavily from ICTY jurisprudence to define the
term “civilian population,”141 and found that so long as the civilian population
is the primary object of the attack, where some combatants are affected, or
indiscriminate acts target military and civilian objects equally, these acts may
also constitute crimes against humanity.142 The Chamber determined that the
attacks needed only to be primarily directed at civilians, who were those not
taking an active part in the conflict, but victims could include non-civilians as
well.143 The Trial Chamber found that crimes directed against the Cambodian
population did not differentiate between military and civilian personnel, and that
because the acts were “all-encompassing, engulfing both civilian and military
elements without distinction,” the attacks were directed against a civilian
population.144
Of particular interest, the Trial Chamber decided that members of the
military forces interrogated and executed by the Khmer Rouge could be
considered the victims of crimes against humanity145 and concluded that crimes
committed against former Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK) soldiers
137 See Case 001, Judgement, supra note 59, ¶ 322. This was the first case before the Extraordinary
Chambers. Id. The Trial Chamber noted that the attack on the Cambodian population occurred in parallel with
an international armed conflict, but was primarily targeting Cambodian nationals. Id. The Trial Chamber found
that the attacks were perpetrated “[a]gainst the backdrop of an international armed conflict,” and that armed
hostilities existed between Cambodia and Vietnam from 17 April 1975 through 6 January 1979. Id. ¶ 320, 402.
These findings were implicitly affirmed on appeal. See Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No.
001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgement (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Case 001, Appeal Judgement] (taking
the failure to address these findings as implicit affirmation).
138 Case 001, Judgement, supra note 59, ¶ 420.
139 Id. ¶ 304.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. See generally id. ¶¶ 304–12.
143 Id. ¶¶ 303–05.
144 Id. ¶ 325.
145 See id.
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at S-21 constituted crimes against humanity.146 Noting that the detainees at S-21
were drawn from all parts of the country and all sectors of Cambodian society,147
the judgment found that they were targeted because they were considered
“enemies of the regime,” a category that included foreigners, civilians, members
of the Lol Nun government, and RAK military personnel.148 Thus, the Trial
Chamber concluded that the crimes were aimed at a civilian population, which
included former RAK soldiers,149 findings that were affirmed on appeal.150
In Case 002 before the ECCC, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, the Trial
Chamber addressed the situation of Khmer Republic soldiers who had fought
against the Khmer Rouge until April 17, 1975 when the Khmer Republic forces
surrendered.151 The Court found that the Khmer Rouge had committed a
widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Cambodia,
and that after their surrender in 1975, the “Khmer Republic soldiers not taking a
direct part in hostilities” were “civilians or, at minimum, hors de combat,
thereby enjoying the same protection as civilians.”152
The Trial Chamber found that “the civilian population included all persons
who were not members of the armed forces or otherwise recognised as
combatants.”153 Somewhat confusingly, the Trial Chamber noted that “[a]
member of an armed organization is not accorded civilian status by reason of the
fact that he or she is not armed or in combat at the time of the commission of the
crimes,” suggesting that formal status, as opposed to the person’s actual
situation, is the relevant test.154 This led the Chamber to conclude that “soldiers
hors de combat do not qualify as ‘civilians’ for the purposes of Article 5.”155
This did not prevent them from becoming the victims of a crime against
humanity as “there is no requirement nor is it an element of crimes against

146

Id. ¶ 322. Ex-Khmer Rouge officials and others considered enemies were executed by military personnel
answering to zone secretaries acting on orders from the Standing Committee in Phnom Penh. Prosecutor v. Nuon
Chea, et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, ¶¶ 146–49 (Sept. 15, 2010). The soldiers of
RAK Division 502 were executed, interrogated, subjected to forced labor, or persecuted in a series of purges—
or any combination thereof—from 1975–1979. Id.
147 Case 001, Judgement, supra note 59, ¶ 322.
148 Id.
149 Id. ¶ 324.
150 See Case 001, Appeal Judgement, supra note 137.
151 Case 002, Judgement, supra note 89, ¶ 9–11.
152 Id. ¶ 194.
153 Id. ¶ 185.
154 Id. ¶ 186.
155 Id.
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humanity that the victims of the underlying crimes be civilians.”156 The Chamber
added that as a general matter, “the armed law enforcement agencies of a State
are considered to be civilians for purposes of international humanitarian law.”157
B. The Civilian Population Requirement in Peacetime
The ICTY and the ICTR have, on occasion, briefly considered the question
of the commission of crimes against humanity in the absence of armed
conflict.158 In the Kayishema case, the ICTR noted that the armed conflict had
not yet reached the Prefecture in which genocide and crimes against humanity
were taking place.159 The Chamber mused:
Traditionally, legal definitions of ‘civilian’ or ‘civilian population’
have been discussed within the context of armed conflict. However,
under the Statute, crimes against humanity may be committed inside
or outside the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, the term civilian
must be understood within the context of war as well as relative
peace. The Trial Chamber considers that a wide definition of civilian
is applicable and, in the context of the situation of
Kibuye Prefecture where there was no armed conflict, includes all
persons except those who have the duty to maintain public order and
have the legitimate means to exercise force. Non-civilians would
include, for example, members of the FAR, the RPF, the police and the
Gendarmerie Nationale.160

The Chamber advocated for a broad definition of “civilian,” although it nuanced
this by listing those who do not qualify as civilians, including those who
participated as members of the “armed forces” during the Rwandan genocide.161
Finally, in one of its most recent cases, Prosecutor v. Šainović, the ICTY
noted that the concept of an “attack” for purposes of crimes against humanity is
not the same as it is for war crimes.162 Rather, it found:
The concept of an “attack” is not identical to that of an “armed
conflict”, seeing as an attack can precede, outlast, or continue during
an armed conflict, but need not be a part of it. “Attack in the context
156

Id. ¶ 187.
Id. ¶ 186.
158 See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 123, ¶ 621–23.
159 Id. ¶ 125–26.
160 Id. ¶ 127 (emphasis in original).
161 Id. It may also be of importance that “[a]s Prefect, Kayishema was a State actor.” Id. ¶ 126. As such,
Kayishema falls into the category of non-civilian identified by the Trial Chamber. Id. ¶ 127.
162 Prosecutor v. Šainovic, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgement, ¶ 144 (Trial Chamber Feb. 26, 2009).
157
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of a crime against humanity can be defined as a course of conduct
involving the commission of acts of violence. It is not limited to the
use of armed force; it encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian
population.”163

The Trial Chamber endorsed the view that “[i]n order to give full effect to the
object and purpose of customary international law prohibiting crimes against
humanity, it is necessary to adopt a broad definition of the key terms that extends
as much protection as possible.”164 This view appears to be a return to the
original position of the Tribunal articulated in the Tadić case many years
prior.165
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION REQUIREMENT BY
THE ICC
A. The Early Jurisprudence of the Court
The ICC’s Chambers have noted that neither the Statute itself, nor the
Elements of Crimes, defines the term “civilian population.”166 Following ICTY
precedent, Chambers have relied upon the definition in Article 50 of AP I as the
appropriate standard,167 even though none of the cases have involved a situation
involving international armed conflict.
In the Bemba case, Pre-Trial Chamber I observed that “the term ‘civilians’
or ‘civilian population’ is not defined in the Statute.168 However, according to
the well-established principle of international humanitarian law, ‘[t]he civilian
population (. . .) comprises all persons who are civilians as opposed to members
of armed forces and other legitimate combatants.’”169 This formulation has been
cited with approval in other Pre-Trial Chamber decisions, such as the
Confirmation of Charges decision in Ntaganda.170
163 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement,
¶ 543 (Trial Chamber I Jan. 17, 2005)).
164 Id. ¶ 147.
165 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra note 69; supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
166 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b), ¶ 76 (June 15,
2009) [hereinafter Bemba, Confirmation of Charges].
167 Id. ¶ 78; see also Case 001, Judgement, supra note 59, ¶ 322.
168 Bemba, Confirmation of Charges, supra note 166, ¶ 78.
169 Id. ¶ 78 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Trial Judgement, supra note 74, ¶ 425) (omission in original).
170 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, 65 n.22 (Pre-Trial Chamber II June
9, 2014).

SADAT GALLEYSPROOFS2

2017]

2/27/2017 2:39 PM

PUTTING PEACETIME FIRST

231

Likewise, in its decision confirming the charges against Germain Katanga,
Pre-Trial Chamber II found that a civilian is:
“any person who does not belong to any of the categories of persons
referred to in Article 4 (A)(l), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention
and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is
civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.” For the
purpose of this Decision, whenever the Chamber refers to “civilians”,
“civilian population”, “protected persons”, “protected civilians”, or
“persons protected” under the Geneva Conventions, it considers that
this also encompasses the relevant provisions of the AP I.171

Trial Chamber II recently concurred in its judgment convicting Katanga of
crimes against humanity, explicitly endorsing the definition of civilian in AP
I.172 A similar position was taken by Trial Chamber III in the Bemba case handed
down early in 2016, when it both endorsed the AP I definition of “civilian
population” and stated that it considered the definition to be “customary in
nature.”173
The Pre-Trial Chambers have even referred to the laws of war in defining
the elements of crimes against humanity in peacetime—in the Kenya situation,
for example—citing an assortment of humanitarian law provisions to support the
assertion that that “[t]he term ‘civilian population’ refers to persons who are
civilians, as opposed to members of armed forces and other legitimate
combatants.”174 Upon close reading, however, the opinions, which contain little
substantive analysis, suggest that the Pre-Trial Chambers may not have
considered the issues involved in depth as they inserted language from ICTY
and ICTR cases (and earlier ICC cases) into their decisions. This is also
evidenced by the judgments in Katanga175 and Bemba,176 as well as earlier

171 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 266
n.366 (Pre-Trial Chamber I Sept. 30, 2008) (quoting Article 50 of AP I).
172 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, ¶ 1102 (Trial Chamber II Mar. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Judgment].
173 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Trial Judgment, supra note 89, ¶ 152.
174 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute
on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶ 82 (Pre-Trial Chamber II
Mar. 31, 2010).
175 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Judgment, supra note 172.
176 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Trial Judgment, supra note 89. The Trial Chamber relied on its earlier decision in
Katanga as well as the Blaškić, Kordić, and Mrkšić Appeal Judgments at the ICTY and the Case 002 Trial
Judgment at the ECCC in finding that the AP I definition of “civilian population” was customary international
law. Id. ¶ 152, n.342.
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Confirmation decisions of the Court.177 Pre-Trial Chamber II declined to discuss
the contextual elements of crimes against humanity in-depth in the Kenyatta
case, instead finding, without analysis, that “they are well settled in the
jurisprudence of the Court.”178
If this jurisprudence is indeed “settled,” it would be unfortunate. The Court
has not yet had the opportunity to grapple neither with the complexities of the
definition nor with the important differences between the ICC Statute and the
Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals regarding crimes against humanity, because none
of the cases have really squarely presented the issue. Given, however, that these
issues are likely to surface in future cases, consideration of this question is
particularly timely at this juncture. Moreover, it is interesting that the new ICRC
commentary appears to be nudging customary IHL towards greater and more
comprehensive protection from the guarantees of Common Article 3 from
inhumane treatment for all individuals, even members of a party’s armed forces.
It would be unfortunate if, just as IHL is potentially moving towards broader
protections for members of the armed forces, the ICC, using case law developed
under earlier and more formal interpretations of the Geneva Conventions and
the Protocols thereto, was pushing crimes against humanity law (erroneously, in
the view of this author) to comply with an IHL paradigm that may ultimately be
abandoned in the future.179
On a final note, it is interesting that to the extent that the Court’s Pre-Trial
Chambers have been presented with or considered the issue in more depth, they
have employed the analysis suggested here. Thus, in the Abu Garda case, in
considering the status of peacekeepers, Pre-Trial Chamber I followed the SCSL
and held that peacekeepers are entitled to the protections enjoyed by civilians,
except when they directly participate in hostilities or combat related activities.180
This suggests that a functional, as opposed to a formal, status-based approach
may be acceptable to Chambers, at least in certain circumstances.181
177 See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-381-Red, Public Redacted Version—
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 109 (PreTrial Chamber II Jan. 23, 2012).
178 Id. The Pre-Trial Chamber did add that “any civilian population” could refer to groups distinguishable
by their (perceived) political affiliation, as well as their nationality or ethnicity. Id. ¶ 110.
179 As noted earlier, it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage fully with the current fluidity in IHL.
The new ICRC Commentary, while highly authoritative, has not yet been relied upon in case law due to its recent
vintage and defendants will undoubtedly be challenging its application before the ICC.
180 Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09, Public Redacted Version—Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges, ¶ 71 (Pre-Trial Chamber I Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Decision].
181 Id. Another possibility is that they may be clarifying the status of the peacekeepers based upon functional
realities, since peacekeepers do not, per se, fall into the category of “combatants.”
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B. Seven Canons of ICC Treaty Interpretation
Interpreting the ICC Statute partakes as much of art as of science.182 In prior
writings, I have suggested a methodology applying seven canons in addressing
interpretative questions relating to the substantive law of the Statute based upon
Articles 21 and 22 of the Statute, which are briefly summarized as follows:183
First, a plain reading of the text of the ICC Statute is required (Article 21(1)(a)),
using ordinary principles of treaty interpretation such as good faith and
consideration of context;184 second, the reading must be faithful to the object and
purpose of the ICC Statute and consistent with the legality principle embodied
in Article 22(2);185 third, where the meaning of a particular provision remains
ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable, the travaux préparatoires may be consulted;186 fourth, if gaps
remain in the interpretation of a particular provision, the Court should look to
Article 21(1)(b) sources of law, which include “applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of
the international law of armed conflict,” and, failing that, Article 21(1)(c)
sources that are “general principles of law derived by the Court from national
laws of legal systems of the world. . . ;”187 fifth, all provisions should be
construed with the objective of protecting the rights of the accused and ensuring
that the application of the Statute is consistent with internationally recognized
human rights (Article 21(3)).188
In addition, I have suggested two additional canons that should guide any
consideration of open questions in the ICC Statute: The interpretation adopted
should enhance judicial efficiency and the effectiveness of the ICC trial system,
without compromising the values expressed in Canon 5 above (Canon 6);189 and
the interpretation of a particular provision should enhance the expressive and
normative function of international criminal law by rendering it transparent and
comprehensible and reduce opportunities for fragmentation (Canon 7).190 As we
shall see, using this methodology (which is largely required by the ICC Statute
182

See generally Sadat & Jolly, supra note 62.
Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1115
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
187 Sadat & Jolly, supra note 62.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
183
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itself as well as general international law), assists considerably in finding the
meaning of Article 7’s reference to “civilian population.”191 Although Article 21
establishes an interpretative hierarchy,192 it is important to view these provisions
and the canons articulated here in a holistic way rather than in a strictly linear
matter, as they inform each other. Thus, as others have written of Article 38(1)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, “they are listed in the order
that they would normally present themselves to the mind of an international
judge, and in this way form a practical methodology.”193
C. Interpreting Article 7 of the Rome Statute
1. A Textual and Contextual Analysis of Article 7 (Canon 1)
The inquiry into the meaning of the term “civilian population” in Article
7(1)194 begins with the text of the Statute and the Elements of Crimes, looking
for plain meaning in context, and consistent with the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute. Although it is not typically useful to look for dictionary
definitions of terms of art, the ICC has done so in the past,195 as have other
courts.196 Thus, I do so here for the sake of completeness, although the effort is
not particularly helpful.
The Oxford English Dictionary refers to a civilian as “a person who is not
professionally employed in the armed forces; a non-military person.”197
Merriam-Webster and other American references suggest that civilians are
“person(s) . . . not on active duty with a military, naval, police, or fire fighting

191

See generally Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7.
See generally id. art. 21.
193 The Permanent Court of International Justice [PCIJ], Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux
of the Proceedings of the Committee: June 16th—July 24th 1920 (with Annexes), at 333 (2006); see also, Sadat
& Jolly, supra note 62, at 764.
194 This Article does not address the “population” element as this part of the locution is relatively
uncontroversial. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1).
195 Prosecutor v. Matthew Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12, Decision, ¶ 41 (Trial Chamber II Dec. 16, 2015).
196 To take just one example, the United States Supreme Court often references the dictionary to define
terms in federal statutes or international treaties. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the
Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94
MARQ. L. REV. 77, 85 (2010) (noting that Supreme Court justices have referenced dictionary definitions to define
295 words or phrases in 225 opinions between 2000 and 2010).
197 Civilian, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/33577?redirectedFrom=
civilian& (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
192
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organization.”198 If one consults a specialized dictionary, the combined term is
defined with reference to humanitarian law, with the definition in AP I most
commonly referred to.199
An immediate question arises whether police and firefighters are excluded
or included. The early jurisprudence of the ICTR addressed this by using a
negative definition, stating that “a civilian is anyone who falls outside the
category of a perpetrator” as defined “as a matter of evidence on a case-by-case
basis.”200 Although the ICTY Appeals Chamber departed from this perspective
in Blaškić, it seems more appropriate to look at the function of a particular group
in determining whether its members are part of the population under attack or
potential perpetrators. The ICRC survey of customary international law defines
“civilians” as individuals who are “not members of the armed forces,”201 and
notes that “[t]he civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.”202
This tautological definition evolved to distinguish those who could be lawfully
targeted by hostile forces from those who could not.203 The combination of
specialized and non-specialized texts suggests that in international armed
conflict, a “civilian” is everyone not a member of the armed forces on active
duty; in non-international armed conflict the text of Protocol II refers to those
persons who “do not take a direct part in hostilities,”204 or, as the Rwanda
Tribunal has found, those who are not “fighters” or perpetrators of the crimes
alleged.205
However, what about in peacetime? Is it sensible to exclude members of the
armed forces from the class of individuals who are potential victims of crimes
against humanity? Moreover, even during armed conflict, what about those hors
de combat who are no longer able to fight? What about U.N. Peacekeepers,
military contractors, or civilian police forces? These are not merely hypothetical
questions but have come up at the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and at
198 Civilian, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/civilian (last visited Jan. 8, 2017);
see also Civilian, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civilian (last visited Jan. 8,
2017) (defining “civilian” as “a person who is not a member of the military or of a police or firefighting force”).
199 See, e.g., CLIVE PARRY & JOHN P. GRANT, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82
(John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 2d ed. 2004). A brief survey of French sources revealed no significant
differences from English language sources, so they are not included here.
200 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Judgement, supra note 121, ¶ 71.
201 Customary IHL: Rule 5. Definition of Civilians, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS [ICRC], https://www.icrc.
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule5 (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Additional Protocol II, supra note 65, art. 4, ¶ 1.
205 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 123, ¶ 127.
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the ICC. The Framers of the Rome Statute did not consider these questions in
depth, either during the elaboration of the Rome Statute itself, or in formulating
the Elements of Crimes, leaving open this provision for the judges of the ICC to
interpret (keeping in mind the legality principle).206 Given then that the “plain
meaning” of the text is not entirely obvious,207 one turns to the object and
purpose of the ICC Statute and Article 7 more generally in understanding the
notion of civilian population in context.
2. Object and Purpose of the ICC Statute (Canon 2)
The term “civilian population” first appeared in the text of Article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter on crimes against humanity, which criminalizes “murder . . .
and other inhumane acts against any civilian population.”208 However, it was not
defined.209 In early drafts, what would become crimes against humanity was
referred to as “atrocities and persecutions and deportations on political, racial or
religious grounds.”210 It was not until July 31, 1945 that the term “crimes against
humanity” appeared in the draft.211 A note by Robert Jackson indicated that the
intention was to make sure that “we are reaching persecution, etc., of Jews and
others in Germany as well as outside of it, and before as well as after
commencement of the war.”212
The Nuremberg Tribunal did not elaborate upon the meaning of civilian
population, but scholars writing contemporaneously have noted the importance
of the word ‘any’ modifying civilian, which permitted the Tribunal to reach not
only crimes committed in Axis-occupied Europe (which would have been
reachable as war crimes for the most part), but crimes committed on Axis
territory.213 According to Egon Schwelb—one of the leading authors published
on the question at the time—“the term ‘crime against humanity’ is restricted to
206

See Robinson, supra note 47, at 78.
See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7.
208 Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c), adopted Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, reprinted
in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 10, 11 (1947).
209 Id.
210 Revised Draft of Agreement and Memorandum Submitted by American Delegation, June 30, 1945,
reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MILITARY TRIALS, at 119, 121 (U.S. Dep’t. of State, 1949).
211 Revised Definition of “Crimes,” Submitted by American Delegation, July 31, 1945, reprinted in REPORT
OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, at
395 (U.S. Dep’t. of State, 1949) (the London Conference convened on June 26, and the Charter was signed on
August 8, 1945). Id.
212 Id. at 394.
213 Schwelb, supra note 14, at 188–91.
207
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inhumane acts committed against civilian populations as distinguished from
members of the armed forces.”214 Schwelb postulated, however, that perhaps
even the armed forces could be subject to persecutions.215 Others have noted the
importance of the word “population,” which suggests a large-scale as opposed
to an isolated attack.216
The object then, was to reach cases in which the laws of war did not apply;
the purpose was to provide protection for individuals from attack in the form of
widespread or systematic human rights abuses perpetrated by States (and later,
by organizations),217 as well as to condemn the gravity and perniciousness of the
harm. During armed conflict, Article 7 of the ICC Statute expands the
protections offered by the laws of war by addressing acts not specifically
covered by those texts (such as persecution) and by extending their application
to acts against a State’s (or by analogy, an organization’s) own citizens or
members.218 During peacetime, Article 7 has perhaps its most revolutionary
application: It renders criminal widespread or systematic attacks by a State or
organization that involve the commission of the crimes in Article 7(1), so long
as the attack is carried out pursuant to a policy219 and directed against any
“population” (not just individuals). The only individuals seemingly excluded
would be those actually perpetrating the attacks. In other words, the term
“civilian population” appears to be defined in the negative—as the ICTR
suggested in Kayeshima220—as everyone not involved in perpetrating the attack.
To the extent that a textual analysis and consideration of object and purpose
are inconclusive, we next turn to the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute.

214

Id. at 190.
Id. (noting that the Berlin Protocol, which removed the semi-colon from Article 6(c) before the phrase
“or persecutions” and replaced it with a comma, may have eliminated this possible interpretation).
216 Id. at 191.
217 See Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 18, reprinted in Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, ¶ 50 (1996) (including
organizations and groups as instigators of crimes against humanity for the first time).
218 See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7.
219 Id. Although the policy element was rejected by the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, it was
specifically added to Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
220 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 123, ¶ 127.
215
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3. The Travaux Préparatoires of the Rome Statute (Canon 3)
The term “civilian” appears in the Rome Statute twenty times, seven of
which are part of the phrase “civilian population,” which appears twice in Article
7.221 It is not defined.
At the beginning of the Rome Conference, the inclusion of a reference to the
“civilian population” in the chapeau for crimes against humanity was not a
foregone conclusion. The Report of the Preparatory Committee suggested a wide
array of options:
For the purpose of the present Statute, a “crime against humanity”
means any of the following acts when committed
[as part of a widespread [and] [or] systematic commission of such acts
against any population]:
[as part of a widespread [and] [or] systematic attack against any
[civilian] population] [committed on a massive scale] [in armed
conflict] [on political, philosophical, racial, ethnic or religious grounds
or any other arbitrarily defined grounds].222

Discussions in the Preparatory Committee between March 25, 1996 and
April 12, 1996 reveal divisions between delegations as to whether a civilian
population criterion should be included in the Rome Statute.223 Many
delegations favored the criterion as it emphasized that “crimes against humanity
could be committed against any civilian population.”224 Others, however,
thought the phrase “attack on a civilian population” “was vague, unnecessary
and confusing since . . . the term ‘civilian’ was often used in international
humanitarian law and was unnecessary in the current context.”225 The phrase
was retained “to avoid significantly changing the existing definition of these
crimes.”226

221

See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7.
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/2 (Apr. 14, 1998), as reprinted in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS 5, http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/
proceedings/contents.htm. Citations to OFFICIAL RECORDS refer to the Official Records of the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.
223 Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Summary of the Proceedings of the
Preparatory Committee During the Period 25 March–12 April 1996, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1 (May 7, 1996).
224 Id. (emphasis added).
225 Id.
226 Id.
222
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During the Diplomatic Conference, the definition of crimes against humanity
was considered in the Committee of the Whole during its third and fourth
meetings on June 17, 1998.227 References to the civilian population criterion in
the Summary Records of the Committee of the Whole are scarce and the word
“civilian” only appears a few times in connection with crimes against humanity
in the summary records of these meetings.228
In the Committee’s third meeting, Djibouti, Malta, and Slovenia observed
that crimes against humanity were “directed against a civilian population but did
not otherwise comment on the meaning of the term.”229 The Republic of Korea
remarked that “the reference to ‘civilian’ population [is] confusing” and
supported adopting the proposal of the Preparatory Committee without this
language.230 Spain remarked that “[p]rosecution of crimes against humanity
should not be confused with international humanitarian law, as otherwise the
victims of atrocities might be left unprotected.”231
In the Committee’s fourth meeting, Russia expressed its view that the Statute
should require the attack against the civilian population to be “widespread and
systematic,” but did not comment directly on the civilian population element.232
Israel opined that “[t]he concept of crimes against humanity should be
differentiated from that of war crimes by specifying that they were crimes
committed on a massive scale against any civilian population on political, racial
or other grounds to be defined.”233

227 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Summary Records of the 3d Plenary Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/13 (June 17, 1998), reprinted in 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS 146 [hereinafter U.N. Diplomatic
Conference, Third Plenary Meeting]; U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Summary Records of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the Committee of the Whole,
¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (June 17, 1998), reprinted in 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS 154 [hereinafter U.N.
Diplomatic Conference, Fourth Plenary Meeting].
228 See generally U.N. Diplomatic Conference, Third Plenary Meeting, supra note 227; U.N. Diplomatic
Conference, Fourth Plenary Meeting, supra note 227.
229 See U.N. Diplomatic Conference, Third Plenary Meeting, supra note 227, ¶¶ 40, 109, 142 (statements
of Malta, Slovenia, and Djibouti respectively).
230 Id. ¶ 77 (statement of Korea).
231 Id. ¶ 147 (statement of Spain).
232 U.N. Diplomatic Conference, Fourth Plenary Meeting, supra note 227, ¶ 5 (statement of Russia).
233 Id. ¶ 25 (statement of Israel).
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By July 6, 1998, the current text of Article 7 was settled.234 The definition of
crimes against humanity in the July 6 Bureau Discussion Paper on Jurisdiction,
Admissibility and Applicable Law is practically identical to the Rome Statute235
and does not mark it as unsettled or needing further discussion,236 with the
exception of the text regarding crimes of sexual violence and other inhumane
acts.237 In debate, delegates characterized this definition of crimes against
humanity as having wide support.238 This is reflected in the Report of the
Committee of the Whole.239
It therefore seems that whether to include a civilian population requirement
in the Rome Statute was solved in working group or informal consultations. As
records of these discussions are not available, the formal travaux offer little
guidance.240
In Roy S. Lee’s edited volume on the negotiation of the Rome Statute,
Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson reported that “several delegations made
clear that the term ‘attack directed against any civilian population’ was . . . a
term of art as explained in sub-paragraph 2(a) and in the relevant
jurisprudence.”241 They add:
[S]ome delegations would have preferred to refer to “any population”
rather than “any civilian population”, [sic] but as part of the

234 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Bureau Discussion Paper, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53 (July 6, 1998), reprinted in 3 OFFICIAL
RECORDS 204 [hereinafter Bureau Discussion Paper].
235 The inverted commas in the chapeau of Article 7(1) are missing. Compare Bureau Discussion Paper,
supra note 234, with Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1).
236 Bureau Discussion Paper, supra note 234.
237 Id.; see Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1)(g), (k).
238 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Summary Records of the Twenty-Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Committee of the Whole ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/13 (July 8, 1998), reprinted in 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS 267 (statement of the Netherlands).
239 This iteration includes the inverted commas. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rep. of the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/8 (July 17, 1998), reprinted in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS 93.
240 Andreas Zimmermann, The Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court, in 2 MAX PLANCK
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 169, 178 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum, eds. 1998). Whether
members of the armed forces could be the victims of crimes against humanity proved to be a difficult issue. Id.
Part of this question concerns whether the relevant rules of IHL must be referenced as the exclusive source for
the legal status of members of the armed forces. However, there was little discussion of it at the Diplomatic
Conference. Id.
241 Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 79, 97 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
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compromise the latter term was maintained, as it was consistent with
customary international law.242

Finally, they noted that some delegations pointed out that the term has been
judicially interpreted in a “flexible manner, so that combatants do not necessarily
lose all protection (making reference to the Barbie decision of the French Cour
de Cassation and the Tadić Opinion and Judgement).”243
Following the adoption of the ICC Statute, delegates addressed the questions
left open in Rome as work began on the Elements of Crimes. During the
meetings of the Preparatory Commission convened for this purpose,244
Switzerland submitted a commentary concerning Article 7 for the Working
Group on the Elements of Crimes that summarized the jurisprudence available
to date on crimes against humanity, including discussion of the “civilian
population” element.245
The Swiss paper set forth the holdings of the Akayesu,246 Kayishema,247 and
Tadić248 cases, discussed supra in Parts I(A)(1) and (2), which presumably
informed the discussions, although it is not clear that the term “civilian
population” was the subject of much debate.
From Akayesu, Switzerland quoted the following language:
Members of the civilian population are people who are not taking any
active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces
who laid down their arms and those persons placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause. Where there are certain
individuals within the civilian population who do not come within the
definition of civilians, this does not deprive the population of its
civilian character.249

The Commentary observed that “this definition assimilates the definition of
‘civilian’ to the categories of person protected by Common Article 3 of the
242

Id. at 97 n.54.
Id.
244 See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its
first, second and third sessions (16-26 February, 26 July-13 August and 29 November-17 December 1999), U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.1.
245 Switzerland Commentary, supra note 73.
246 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 119.
247 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 123.
248 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra note 69.
249 Switzerland Commentary, supra note 73 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note
119, ¶ 582) (emphasis omitted).
243
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Geneva Conventions; an assimilation which would not appear to be
problematic.”250 It also noted the Akayesu Chamber’s reliance upon the earlier
Mrkšić judgment, which recognized that “crimes against humanity could be
committed where the victims were captured members of a resistance movement
who at one time had borne arms, who would thus qualify as persons placed hors
de combat by detention.”251 As Part I noted,252 these findings were later set aside,
in part, on appeal. Nonetheless, since the appeals decisions were not yet
available during the negotiation of the Elements of Crimes, these cases and their
positive mention in the Commentary prepared by Switzerland seem relevant to
an understanding of the Elements of Crimes and Article 7 more generally.
The Swiss Commentary also drew language from Kayishema & Ruzindana
to the effect that “the term civilian must be understood within the context of war
as well as relative peace.”253 Finally, Switzerland noted that Trial Chamber II in
Tadić254 confirmed that “crimes against humanity can be committed against
civilians of the same nationality as the perpetrator or those who are stateless, as
well as those of a different nationality.”255 Switzerland also noted the statement
by the Trial Chamber that the laws and customs of war only apply to crimes
against humanity “by analogy” and not directly.256
Commentators have noted that the Swiss paper was “helpful” to the
discussions on the Elements of the chapeau for Article 7.257 However, there is
little mention of any discussion of the meaning of “civilian population” either in
the leading commentary on the discussion of the Elements,258 or during the
discussions of the Preparatory Commission in June 2000 during which the
Elements of crimes against humanity were finalized.259
250

Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 119, ¶ 582 n.146).
Id.
252 See supra Part I.
253 Switzerland Commentary, supra note 73 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note
123, ¶ 127). For the full quote see supra Part I.B.
254 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra note 69.
255 Switzerland Commentary, supra note 73 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra note 69,
¶ 635).
256 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgement, supra note 69, ¶ 639).
257 See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 79, 97 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
258 Robinson, supra note 47, at 78. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Part II: Finalized Draft of the Elements of Crimes
(13-31 March and 12-30 June 2000), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
259 Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court: Part II: Finalized Draft of the Elements of Crimes (13-31 March and 12-30 June
2000), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
251
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4. Article 21(1)(b) Sources: Treaties, Customary International Law, and
General Principles (Canon 4)
a. Treaties
Article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute permits the Court to make reference to
“applicable” treaties where appropriate, which it has found include treaties
embodying provisions of the laws of war,260 although we have seen Chambers
depart from those treaties if they believe the Statute mandates a different
result.261 This Section therefore explores IHL treaties to consider the meaning
of the term “civilian” in that body of law before turning to customary
international law in Part II.C.4(b). As there is no international convention on
crimes against humanity as of yet,262 this section canvasses treaties on the laws
of war for possible insight on the meaning of the term “civilian” in the context
of Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
i. Development of the Law Prior to 1949
There are few direct references to the term “civilian” in the major texts
codifying the laws of war which were elaborated during the twentieth century,
and even fewer in the century prior. But the idea of distinguishing individuals
who may lawfully be targeted by hostile forces and those protected from direct
attack is a thread running through all these codifications of the laws of war.263
For example, the Lieber Code of 1863 distinguishes between combatants and
noncombatants, the latter being “unarmed citizens of the hostile government,”264
and permits only the direct destruction of “armed enemies” suggesting that those
who are unarmed may not be directly targeted.265 It also notes that “protection
of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule,” suggesting

260 These include the Genocide Convention and the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Trial Judgment, supra note 89, ¶ 70 (giving examples of treaties that have been applied
by the Court).
261 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Trial Judgment, supra note 21, ¶¶ 534–36 (Trial Chamber I rejecting
the Additional Protocol II requirement that organized armed groups have control over territory).
262 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
263 See generally Claire Garbett, The Concept of the Civilian: Legal Recognition, Adjudication and the
Trials of International Criminal Justice, 8 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 469 (2012).
264 Francis Lieber, General Orders No. 100 (Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field), art. 155, ¶ 1 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A
COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, SERIES III, VOL. III, H.R.
Doc. No. 287, 148–64 (1899).
265 Id. art. 15.
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(anachronistically and erroneously) that this is the “modern” approach of “The
Europeans” as opposed to the practice of “barbarous armies.”266
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of
1864 and 1929 also employed the term “civilian” sparingly (or not at all, in the
case of the 1864 Convention), but each treaty incorporates the idea of individuals
protected during war time from attack. For example, the Geneva Convention of
1864 addresses the wounded in war and does not use the term “civilian
population.”267 Yet, like the Lieber Code, it carved out categories of persons—
namely hospital and ambulance personnel, including administrative and
transport services and chaplains268—and “inhabitants of the country who bring
help to the wounded”—whose neutrality shall be respected or, in the latter case,
who “shall remain free.”269 The Hague Convention of 1899 used the term
“civilian” in Article 29, which provides that “civilians, carrying out their mission
openly, charged with the delivery of dispatches destined either for their own
army or for that of the enemy . . . are not considered spies.”270 This language is
retained in the 1907 Convention, which confirmed the provisions of its 1899
predecessor.271 Like the Third Geneva Convention of 1949,272 the Hague
Convention of 1907 provided that the “armed forces of the belligerent parties
may consist of combatants and non-combatants,”273 both of which are entitled
to protection if captured. Likewise, individuals who “follow an army without
directly belonging to it, such as newspaper correspondents and reporters, sutlers
and contractors,”274 are also entitled to POW treatment under certain
circumstances. This sets up two categories of individuals governed by the
conventions: those in the armed forces, some of whom are “combatants”; and

266

Id. art. 24.
See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,
adopted Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940 (no longer in force).
268 Id. art. 2.
269 Id. art. 5.
270 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War of Land and its Annex: Regulation
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 29, adopted July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
271 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 29, adopted Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter
H.C. IV].
272 The Third Geneva Convention considers persons accompanying or in service to the armed forces to be
civilians, but entitled to POW status if captured. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 66, arts. 4(A)(4) & (5);
see also Hans-Peter Gasser & Knut Dörmann, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ¶ 501(4) (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013).
273 H.C. IV, supra note 271.
274 Id. art. 13.
267
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those who are not part of the armed forces and are “civilians.”275 Each has rights
set out in the treaties codifying the laws of war.
ii. The Geneva Conventions of 1949
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 adopted in the wake of the atrocities
committed during World War II updated earlier instruments and added, for the
first time, a convention specifically protecting civilians.276 These Conventions
expanded the scope of international humanitarian law and extended broad
explicit protection to civilians generally, not just specific categories of
individuals, such as POWs or hospital workers.277 The Fourth Geneva
Convention (on civilians) defines those persons that are protected by the
Convention, stating that it covers “persons . . . who . . . find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals.”278 This proviso contains the important
understanding that, as a textual matter, the convention only applies during armed
conflict or occupation.279 These limits on the formal applicability of the
275 Certain persons are part of the armed forces but are not “combatants,” such as chaplains and medical
personnel. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,
supra note 267, art. 2; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 66, art. 38.
276 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION: RELATIVE
TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, 3 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffen & C. W.
Dumbleton trans., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION]. The absence of a specialized
treaty protecting civilians was “explained by the fact that it was until quite recently a cardinal principle of the
law of war that military operations must be confined to the armed forces and that the civilian population must
enjoy complete immunity.” Id.; see New Zealand Red Cross, The Red Cross and Geneva Conventions–60 Years
On, 41 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 113, 113 (2010).
277 New Zealand Red Cross, supra note 276, at 114. The first three Conventions reference the term “civilian
population” sparingly. In the First Geneva Convention “civilian population” is used only once, in Article 18,
which requires that “[t]he civilian population . . . . respect these wounded and sick, and in particular abstain from
offering them violence.” Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 267, art. 18. The Second Geneva Convention does not use the term at all.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 971. The Third Convention (on Prisoners of War)
uses the term in Article 23, which provides, in the relevant part, that “[p]risoners of war shall have shelters
against air bombardment and other hazards of war, to the same extent as the local civilian population.” Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 66, art. 23.
278 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 4.
279 Id. (emphasis added). Subsequent Articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention employ the terms “civilian”
or “civilian population,” including Article 49 (“The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its
own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”); Article 55 (“The Occupying Power may not requisition
foodstuffs . . . except for use by the occupation forces . . . and then only if the requirements of the civilian
population have been taken into account.”); Article 57 (“The Occupying Power may requisition civilian
hospitals . . . on condition that suitable arrangements are made . . . for the needs of the civilian population for
hospital accommodations. The material and stores of civilian hospitals cannot be requisitioned so long as they
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Conventions—which have generated difficulties in the war crimes jurisprudence
of the ad hoc tribunals280—have no parallel in the law of crimes against
humanity. They establish the notion of “protected” persons;281 and have as their
purpose to define the proper object of war—that it is “waged against an enemy’s
armed forces, not against its civilian population.”282
The Fourth Convention brings the notions of “civilians” and “civilian
population” into usage more clearly than any predecessor instrument. However,
like the Rome Statute, it does not define these terms because the drafters could
not agree upon a definition, and proposals to include one were rejected.283
Although it is generally agreed that the provisions of the Fourth Convention
codified customary international law,284 the term “civilian population” was left
undefined until the elaboration of AP I in 1977, when the negative definition of
fighting forces entitled to POW protection as defined in Article 4 of the Third
Geneva Convention was adopted.285 Thus, the meaning of the term in the Fourth
Convention can only be understood in relationship to the Third Convention.

are necessary for the needs of the civilian population”); and Article 63 (requiring non-interference with
organizations tasked with “ensuring the living conditions of the civilian population”). Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 43, arts. 49, 55, 57, 63. The Convention also uses the term “civilian persons” in Articles
10 and 15. Id. arts. 10, 15.
280 The ad hoc tribunals have used a teleological understanding of the Statute to include attacks by Bosnian
Serbs against Bosnian Muslims and Croats as war crimes. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Def. Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 21, ¶¶ 72–78.
281 See Heike Krieger, Protected Persons, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e979?rskey=tBTo3
Q&result=1&prd=EPIL (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (on the notion of “protected persons,” under the Geneva
Conventions).
282 Garbett, supra note 263, at 475 (citing DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 114).
283 According to the travaux préparatoires, the Delegate from the United Kingdom suggested defining the
term “civilian population,” but it was never discussed and the Committee moved onto other Articles. Official
Records of the Diplomatic Conference of the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Committee III (Civilians Convention), Summary Rec. of the Second Mtg.
622, as reprinted in II-A F.R., 620–21, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/RC-Fin-Rec_Dipl-Conf1949.html. Citations to F.R. refer to the Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949. There
was some discussion about dividing up those protected into allies, neutrals, and stateless persons, a discussion
that was apparently tabled indefinitely. Id at 620.
284 See, e.g., HENCKAERTS & DOSWOLD-BECK, supra note 42, at xxxi–xxxii (ICRC, 2005) (noting that the
codification of customary international law relating to the laws of war began with the Lieber Code in 1863 and
continued with the Geneva Conventions of 1949); Fausto Pocar, To What Extent Is Protocol I Customary
International Law?, 78 INT’L L. STUD. 337, 337–38 (2002) (stating that Protocol I to the Fourth Geneva
Convention both codifies and develops customary international law); Waldemar A. Solf, The Protection of
Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol I, 1 AM.
U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 117, 117–18 (1986) (setting out the history of the customary international law principle
of distinction and the protection of civilians).
285 Garbett, supra note 263, at 476.
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There were extensive debates on the content of the Third Geneva Convention
on prisoners of war, particularly as regards the status of civilians who take up
arms against occupying forces.286 Indeed, during the negotiations of both the
Third and Fourth Conventions, the drafters were conscious of getting the balance
between them to be correct. This is because to the extent the Third Convention
expanded POW protection for groups of fighters other than regular armed forces
under international humanitarian law under the Third Convention, it arguably
reduced protection for those individuals (under the Fourth Convention) now
considered combatants by making them legitimate military targets.287 Under
IHL there is no gap between the two Conventions, creating a seamless web of
protection.288
iii. The Adoption of Additional Protocol I
In 1973, sensing the need to further complete the work of 1949, the ICRC
proposed the adoption of two Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, one for
international armed conflict (Additional Protocol I) and a second for noninternational armed conflict (Additional Protocol II).289 One of the texts
submitted was a draft definition for AP I of “civilian population,” as well as
“civilian.” The draft defined civilians as “all human beings who are on the
territory of the Parties to the conflict and who do not form part of the armed

286

Committee II (Prisoners of War), Summary Rec. of the Third Mtg. of the Special Committee 420, as
reprinted in II-A F.R. 420. See Amendment Proposed by Denmark, reprinted in III F.R. 58, (Denmark, for
example, introduced an amendment that would have expanded POW status to civilians acting in self-defense
against imminent threats to their persons or livelihoods and civilians who take up arms against a war of
aggression); Committee II (Prisoners of War), Summary Rec. of the Third Mtg. of the Special Committee 425–
26 (Statement of Denmark), as reprinted in II-A F.R. 425 (this proposal elicited significant objection and was
withdrawn); Plenary, Verbatim Rec. of the Twentieth Mtg. 342 (Statement of the President), as reprinted in IIB F.R. 340. The Plenary Assembly adopted draft Article 3 with the text of the first paragraph (now paragraph
4A), the vote was passed by thirty-three votes to none, with three abstentions. Id.; see generally PAUL DE LA
PRADELLE, LA CONFÉRENCE DIPLOMATIQUE ET LES NOUVELLES CONVENTIONS DE GENÈVE DU 12 AOÛT 1949
48–66 (1951).
287 The Third Geneva Convention applies, for example, to persons who accompany the armed forced
without actually being members thereof (such as civilian members of military aircraft crews and war
correspondents), and crew members of merchant vessels and civil aircraft who do not receive more favorable
treatment under another provision of international law. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 66, art. 4(A)(4),
(5).
288 See COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 276, at 51; Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case
No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 271 (Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/
981116_judg_en.pdf (“[T]here is no gap between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. If an individual is
not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war . . . he or she necessarily falls within
the ambit of Convention IV . . . .”).
289 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 84, and Additional Protocol II, supra note 65.
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forces,”290 and listed the protections afforded the civilian population: It should
not be the object of attack, or the subject of reprisals, and receives these
protections until civilians take a direct part in hostilities.291
The ICRC commentary to the draft attempts to answer the question as to
what does taking direct part in hostilities actually mean:
The expression covers acts of war intended by their nature or purpose
to strike at the personnel and matériel of enemy armed forces. Thus, a
civilian taking part in fighting, whether singly or in a group, becomes
ipso facto a lawful target for such time when he takes a direct part in
hostilities.292

If a civilian who took direct part in hostilities is captured, he is still entitled to
the protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention.293
The intent of the ICRC was to establish a definition of “‘civilians and civilian
population’ which would be in harmony with, but more explicit than Article 13
of the Fourth Geneva Convention,”294 which applied the Convention to “the
whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse
distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political
opinion.”295 The ICRC opined that “as wide as possible a definition . . . [of
civilian] is justified by the purpose intended, namely, general protection against
effects of hostilities.”296 After much negotiation, Article 50 was adopted by
consensus297 although the term “armed forces” was deleted,298 and was instead

290 ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: Commentary 55 (Oct.
1973) [hereinafter Draft Protocols Commentary] (internal citations omitted). The travaux states that the
definition of civilian is not as a person alone, but as a member of the civilian population as well. Id.
291 Id. at 56–59.
292 Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
293 Id.
294 Committee III, Summary Rec. of the Fifth Mtg., ¶ 2, Doc. CDDH/III/SR.5 (Mar. 14, 1974), reprinted in
XIV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 35, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/
RC-records_Vol-14.pdf. Citations to the OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE refer to the
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.
295 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 13.
296 Draft Protocols Commentary, supra note 290, at 55.
297 Plenary, Summary Rec. of the Forty-First Mtg., at 161, Doc. CDDH/SR.41 (May 26, 1977), as reprinted
in VI OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 141, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
pdf/RC-records_Vol-6.pdf.
298 Compare Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 45(1), reprinted in I-3 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 3, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-1.pdf, with
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defined in a separate Article (Article 43 of AP I) that is incorporated into Article
50 of AP I by reference.299 Even after the elaboration of Protocol I in 1977,
however, the rules of humanitarian law “do not tell us who or what the protected
persons . . . are” because they define them in the negative.300
iv. The Failed Attempt to Define “Civilian Population” in Additional
Protocol II
During the 1974–1977 Geneva Conference, the ICRC proposed a draft of
Additional Protocol II (on non-international armed conflicts) which included a
provision defining the term “civilian” and “civilian population,” as those who
were not members of the “armed forces.”301 This provision was deleted302 as part
of a proposal submitted by Pakistan purporting to “simplify” the text.303 This has
left the notion of “civilian population” unclear for non-international armed
conflicts, particularly as regards the members of armed opposition groups.
With respect to non-international armed conflicts, the relevant text is Article
4(1) of AP II referring to persons not taking “a direct part or who have ceased to
take part in hostilities” as the protected class. Article 13 operationalizes this
provision by providing that “[t]he civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack,”304 “unless and for such
time they take direct part in hostilities.”305 The Commentary specifies that to
“not take direct part in hostilities” means “they must not become combatants.”306
Committee III, Rep., ¶ 41(1), Doc. CDDH/50/Rev.1, reprinted in XV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE 229, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-15.pdf.
299 Additional Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 50, ¶ 1.
300 Garbett, supra note 263, at 476 (citing DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 114).
301 Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 25, reprinted in I-3 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 3, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-1.pdf.
302 Plenary, Summary Rec. of the Fifty-Second Mtg., at 135, Doc. CDDH/SR.52 (June 6, 1977), as
reprinted in VII OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 125, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-7.pdf.
303 Plenary, Summary Rec. of the Forty-Ninth Mtg., ¶¶ 10–11, Doc. CDDH/SR.49 (June 2, 1977)
(Statement of Pakistan), reprinted in VII OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 59,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-7.pdf. The simplified proposal emerged as a
consequence of “dissatisfaction with the length of the text as well as with the fact that it ventured into domains
which [delegations] considered sacrosanct and inappropriate for inclusion in an international instrument.” Id.
¶ 10.
304 Additional Protocol II, supra note 65, art. 13, ¶ 2.
305 Draft Protocols Commentary, supra note 290, at 57; Additional Protocol II, supra note 65, art. 13, ¶ 3.
The term “direct part in hostilities” is taken from Common Article 3, where it was first used. ICRC, Commentary
on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, supra note 74, at 1353.
306 Draft Protocols Commentary, supra note 290, at 158.
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It further specifies that the phrase “direct part in hostilities” “covers acts of war
intended by their nature or purpose to strike at the personnel and materiel of
enemy armed forces.”307 Several delegates considered that the term ‘“hostilities”
also includes preparations for combat and returning from combat.308 However,
the ICRC position is that from the moment a civilian ceases to take part in
hostilities, they may no longer be the object of attack.309 Thus, it is not formal
status, but actual situation, that provides the relevant test.310
b. Customary International Law
Customary international law is comprised of widespread and consistent state
practice accepted as law by States.311 Deriving its content and pinpointing its
sources is often difficult.312 The sources of customary international law include
evidence of actual State practice, including declarations and statements, and in
the humanitarian law context “special importance” is attached to “military
manuals and operational handbooks,”313 as well as the work of the ICRC.314 In
307

Id.
Rep. to Committee III on the Work of the Working Group, at 330, Doc. CDDH/III/224, as reprinted in
XV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 327, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
pdf/RC-records_Vol-15.pdf.
309 Draft Protocols Commentary, supra note 290, at 158.
310 See Modirzadeh, supra note 26, at 741. States have argued that this definition allows individuals to take
advantage of their civilian protections by becoming “farmer[s] by day, fighter[s] by night” and that allowing
civilians to retain their protections even while being intricately involved in a conflict encourages disrespect for
the laws of war on the part of combatants endangered by their activities. Id. Michael N. Schmitt, Direct
Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict, in CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN
PROTECTION: FESTSCHRIFT FUR DIETER FLECK 505, 509–10 (H. Fischer et al. eds., 2004);. David Heitner,
Civilian Social Media Activists in the Arab Spring and Beyond: Can They Ever Lose Their Civilian Protections?,
39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1207, 1225–26 (2014) (noting that this more “functional” definition also takes into account
a civilian’s military value—the more essential a civilian is to military success, the more likely they are to have
crossed the threshold into direct participation in hostilities).
311 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031; see The North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. Germany v. Dk) (Fed. Rep. Germany v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20).
312 See generally Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820)). U.S. courts have held that “[t]he law of nations ‘may be ascertained by
consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations;
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.’” Id.; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
72–93 (6th ed. 2008); MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53–55 (4th ed. 2003). Janis
warned of the “inelegance of Customary International Law,” pointing to the diversity of state practice; the
possibility of different decision makers reaching different conclusions on customary international law issues;
and its proclivity to stimulate, rather than diminish, conflict between states. JANIS, supra.
313 DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 6.
314 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWOLD-BECK, supra note 42. The ICRC is responsible for a more than 9,000page, two volume work setting out the Rules (Volume 1) and Practice (Volume 2) of customary international
law. Id.
308
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the context of international criminal law, the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals were exhorted to apply customary international law,315 and it has been
argued that Article 7 of the Rome Statute either represents a codification of
customary international law, or has become customary as more and more States
have ratified the Statute.316 These arguments make reference to ad hoc
international criminal tribunal jurisprudence both appropriate and necessary in
many cases. However, in certain cases the Statutes of the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals deviated from customary international law, such as the
ICTY’s armed conflict nexus requirement for crimes against humanity,
discussed above,317 and in other cases the ICC Statute departs from earlier
instruments and, arguably, customary international law, by including provisions
such as the policy element in the text which were specifically rejected by the ad
hoc tribunals.318 In such cases, it may not be proper to apply ad hoc tribunal case
law at the ICC, as both Judges Kaul and Van Den Wyngaert have observed on
separate occasions.319
With respect to the meaning of “civilian population” in Article 7 of the Rome
Statute, as earlier noted, the most influential decision emanating from the ad hoc
tribunals has been the Blaškić Appeals Judgment, which took the view that
Article 50 of Protocol I provided the definitive standard.320 Whatever the merits
of that decision at the time, it fits only uneasily with the work of tribunals
adjudicating crimes against humanity committed either in non-international

315 The ICTY, for example, was encouraged to “apply rules of international humanitarian law which are
beyond any doubt part of customary law.” U.N. Secretary-General, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Resolution 808 (1993), ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. S/5704 (May 3, 1993).
316 This is a controversial point. Article 10 of the Rome Statute and the text of Article 7 itself suggest that
the definition of crimes against humanity in Article 7 is “for the purpose of this Statute” only. See Leila Nadya
Sadat, Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship Between the Two: Article 10 of the ICC
Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 911 (2000); see generally LEENA GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES IN THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2014). However, as I have noted elsewhere, even if the
Statute did not represent customary international law at the time of its adoption, as increasing numbers of States
ratify the Rome Statute and adopt implementing legislation tracking it, it becomes more difficult to argue that it
has not become customary international law. Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, supra note
11, at 373.
317 See supra Part I.A.
318 See Guénaël Mettraux, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity and the Question of a “Policy”
Element, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011).
319 See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Kaul, ¶ 30 (Pre-Trial Chamber II Mar. 31, 2010); Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/0402/12-4, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Wyngaert, ¶ 9 (Trial
Chamber II Dec. 18, 2012).
320 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 41, ¶ 110–13.
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armed conflict situations or in peacetime. The focus on formal status has created
difficulties at both the ECCC and the ICTY itself, which adopted work-around
solutions to avoid inequitable results, finding that so long as the “attack” was
against the “civilian population,” non-civilians could nonetheless be the victims
of the attack and the accused charged with crimes against humanity for
perpetrating crimes against them.
The Blaškić Appeals Judgment has not been consistently applied by the
Rwanda Tribunal, and, in any event, was not available either in Rome in 1998
or when the Elements of Crimes were being drafted and adopted by the
Preparatory Commission from 2000–2002.321 One cannot say what the
negotiators would have thought about it, but the Swiss paper and its reliance
upon Kayeshima322—from the Rwanda Tribunal—suggest that the drafters
thought that a broader approach was appropriate at the ICC. It is also worth
observing that the 1991 and 1996 versions of the International Law
Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes omitted the term “civilian population”
from the text.323 Although not dispositive of the issue, it suggests some
discomfiture with the limiting notion of the term “civilian” and support for the
notion that it is a holdover from the past that may have been an accurate
description of the criminal acts committed by the Nazi regime but was not
intended to create a legal element of crimes against humanity.
It may be that the ICTY approach is appropriate during international armed
conflict as, during armed conflict, the laws of war are applicable and Protocol I
and the Geneva Conventions may serve as a lex specialis which would not
entirely displace international human rights law,324 but contain rules prohibiting
intentional (military) attacks on civilians325 that are widely considered part of
customary international law. In these cases, it may be useful to align the
provisions of Article 7 of the Rome Statute with those of Article 8 so that
commanders, soldiers, and fighters do not find that they have complied with the

321

2002).

See Rome Statute, supra note 13 (adopted in 1998); Elements of Crimes, supra note 13 (adopted in

322 See Switzerland Commentary, supra note 73. The Kayeshima case is one of only two cases cited in the
Commentary’s discussion of the “civilian population” requirement, the other being Akayesu. See id.
323 Ambos & Wirth, supra note 46, at 7. The 1991 Draft Code of Crimes also made no reference to “civilian
population.” Id.
324 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9).
325 AP I, for example, explicitly prohibits the intentional attacking of civilian targets. Additional Protocol
I, supra note 84, arts. 48, 51, 52. This proscription applies in both international and non-international armed
conflicts. HENCKAERTS & DOSWOLD-BECK, supra note 42, at 3.
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laws of war in their organization and conduct of a particular military attack, only
to discover that they have somehow committed a crime against humanity. Note,
however, that this application of IHL as lex specialis would seem to be narrow,
and limited to the military campaign itself; moreover, the limiting notion of
“protected person” as an individual not sharing the nationality of the attacker,
which is so deeply embedded in the Geneva law relating to IACs,326 appears to
have no relevance to crimes against humanity law, which specifically aims at
the protection of all persons.327
In cases involving non-international armed conflict and peacetime, the
application of AP I and Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention to this
question is both formally inappropriate and problematic. This suggests that the
approach of the ICTR is to be preferred in those cases, and that, in any event,
judges at the ICC should treat the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals—and
particularly the ICTY and the SCSL—on this issue with caution to the extent
that the case law proposes the transposition of terms relating to the application
of IHL during international armed conflict to other scenarios. Although, as noted
earlier, there is now a trend to expand the application of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions to all conflicts, it is not yet clear how that trend might
be operationalized under the ICC Statute, which at least for charging purposes
appears to confine the application of Common Article 3 to cases of “an armed
conflict not of an international character.”328
In peacetime, the international law applicable to determine who may be the
victim of a crime against humanity is international human rights law, not IHL.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees all persons
the right to life,329 and to be free from the acts listed in Article 7(1) of the Rome
Statute.330 Even at the ICTY, it has been understood that the word “attack” in
Article 7 clearly does not mean a military attack,331 meaning that humanitarian
326 Heike Spieker, Protected Persons, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/protectedpersons/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
327 See generally Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 787 (2007).
328 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(c).
329 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, ¶ 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
330 See, e.g., id. art. 7 (prohibiting torture); id. art. 8, ¶ 1 (prohibiting enslavement); id. art. 12 (allowing
individuals to freely leave and re-enter their own country and to choose their residence within that country).
331 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeals Judgement, supra note 78, ¶ 86 (stating that an “attack”
encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population and is not limited to the use of armed force); Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, Trial Judgement, supra note 119, ¶ 581 (defining “attack” as an unlawful act that can be non-violent
in nature); Bemba, Confirmation of Charges, supra note 166, ¶ 75. The Court in Bemba rejected the notion that
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law is not used to assess the meaning of this term. If IHL does not define the
word “attack,” why should it define the group it is unlawful to attack? Instead,
it may be more helpful for the ICC to look at the practice of human rights bodies
and U.N. fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry as potential sources of
customary international law.332
At the Inter-American Court, although many cases have addressed the
commission of crimes against humanity in peacetime and during armed
conflict,333 none provide specific assistance on the definition of “civilian
population.” At the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, several
cases have addressed whether crimes against humanity can be committed in the
absence of armed conflict. In Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, the State had prosecuted
one of its nationals and a Russian national for crimes against humanity.334
Article 61-1 § 1 of the Estonian Criminal Code, defining crimes against
humanity, refers only to “groups” and “native population” and does not employ
the term “civilian population.”335 They were charged with helping to deport the
civilian population of the occupied Republic of Estonia to remote parts of the
Soviet Union.336 The applicants argued that because the deportation had not
occurred during a period of armed conflict, this act was not a crime within the
meaning of the Nuremberg Charter of 1945.337 They then argued that they had
an “attack” must be military in nature and held that “[t]he commission of the acts referred to in Article 7(1) of
the Statute constitute the ‘attack’ itself and, beside the commission of the acts, no additional requirement for the
existence of an ‘attack’ should be proven.” Id.
332 Human rights bodies often exercise “quasi-criminal jurisdiction,” in particular the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights which has decreed and is actively monitoring prosecutions of international crimes in roughly
fifty-one cases in fifteen states. Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The QuasiCriminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2013). The European Court of
Human Rights has also considered questions relating to international crimes. See, e.g., Kononov v. Latvia [GC],
App. No. 36376/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Šimšić v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 51552/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2012); Maktouf & Damjanovic v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. Nos. 2312/08 & 34179/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013).
333 See, e.g., Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits and Reparations,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, ¶ 212 (Nov. 30, 2012). The Court discussed the traditional
distinction between civilians and combatants under international humanitarian law in the context of a
bombardment of civilians by the Columbian Air Force during an alleged confrontation with FARC guerillas. See
id. Reaffirming that attacks can only be directed against military combatants, and not against civilians, the Court
referenced customary international law as well as Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
prohibiting the same. Id. The Court also acknowledged the traditional distinction between combatant and civilian
in time of armed conflict. Id.
334 See generally Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 399.
335 Criminal Code art. 61-1 § 1, as modified by Eestis inimsusevastaseid kuritegusid vói sójakuritegusid
toimepannud isikute kriminaalvastutuse seadus [Act on the Criminal Liability of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes Against Humanity or War Crimes in Estonia], Nov. 9, 1994, R.T. I 1994, 83, 1447 (Est.).
336 Kolk & Kislyiy, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 399, 399.
337 Id. at 408–09.
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no idea that this act would be construed as a crime against humanity six decades
later.338
Although the ECHR held that deportation of the civilian population was not
a crime under national law at that time, it found that this action was recognized
as a crime against humanity under Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter of
1945.339 The Court moreover held that by 1949, crimes against humanity, even
committed during peacetime, were criminalized and prohibited “by general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”340
In Penart v. Estonia, the applicant made a similar argument, asserting that
murder committed in peacetime, in this case in 1953, was not a crime under the
Nuremberg Charter of 1945, and thus could not constitute a crime against
humanity.341 The Court responded that “[a]fter the Second World War, tens of
thousands of persons went into hiding in the forests to avoid repression by the
Soviet authorities; part of those in hiding actively resisted the occupation
regime.”342 Like Kolk & Kislyiy, the Court held that murder was not only
expressly recognized as a crime against humanity under the Nuremberg Charter
but also under the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.343
Overall, human rights bodies, notably the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the ECHR, have progressively expanded the individuals protected by
the prohibition against crimes against humanity, whilst at the same time barring
any amnesties or time limits on prosecution for those responsible for them.344
338

Id.
Id. at 410.
340 Id.
341 Penart v. Estonia, App. No. 14685/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
342 Id. The Court went on to note that “[a]ccording to the data of the security organs, about 1,500 persons
were killed and almost 10,000 arrested in the course of the resistance movement of 1944-1953.” Id.
343 Id. Crimes against humanity are also discussed in Korbely v. Hung., App. No. 9174/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008).
344 See, e.g., Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006). In
this case, an elementary school teacher and member of the Communist Party who opposed the coup d’état of
September 11, 1973 by General Augusto Pinochet, was summarily arrested and shot by police and died the next
day at a hospital. Id. The Court had to decide whether a single murder could constitute a crime against humanity
and if so, whether amnesties could be given to the perpetrators. Id. The Inter-American Court held that “crimes
against humanity include the commission of inhuman acts, such as murder, committed in a context of generalized
or systematic attacks against civilians.” Id. ¶ 96. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Def. Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 21). The Court also held that “[a] single illegal act as those
mentioned above, committed within the described background, would suffice for a crime against humanity to
arise.” Id. Finally, as the summary and extra-judicial execution of the civilian Almonacid-Arellano was a crime
against humanity, any amnesty which would prevent the investigation, identification, and punishment of those
339
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Although most of these cases occurred during periods of armed conflict, a few
significant and precedential cases occurred during peacetime. This precedent
must be treated with caution before the ICC as the standards in civil and criminal
cases are quite different. The cases also do not specifically address the meaning
of the term “civilian population.” Nonetheless, they suggest support for an
application of Article 7 that includes a wide, situation-specific definition of
“civilian.”
Another possible source of State practice may be human rights fact-finding
commissions,345 and there have been many during the past decade since the
Court was established. Most involve the commission of crimes against humanity
during armed conflict including, for example, the Commissions on Gaza346 and
Darfur,347 which used the ICRC Interpretive Guidance and Additional Protocol
I definitions of “civilians,” respectively.348 A notable exception is the
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK), which was established on March 21, 2013 to investigate the
systematic, widespread, and grave violations of human rights in the DPRK.349
In February of 2014, the DPRK Commission published a 372-page report.350
The Commission took the definition of crimes against humanity from Article 7
of the Rome Statute, noting that crimes must be committed against the civilian

responsible must be deemed null and void, as it would violate international law by permitting the derogation of
a non-derogable jus cogens norm. Id. ¶¶ 99–114.
345 For a discussion of the importance of these bodies as a source of practice see Larissa van den Herik &
Catherine Harwood, International Commissions of Inquiry and Jus ad Bellum, in SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR THE UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., forthcoming 2017).
346 Human Rights Council Res. S-21/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/S-21/1 (July 24, 2014) (establishing an
independent, international commission of inquiry).
347 S.C. Res. 1564 (Sept. 18, 2005) (requesting the Security Council establish an international commission
of inquiry).
348 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Comm’n of Inquiry
Established Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-21/1, ¶ 37 n.30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (June
23, 2015); Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, ¶ 166 n.77, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005). The Darfur
Report does not define the term “civilian” but grounds the principle of distinction in Additional Protocols I and
II. Id.
349 Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/
coidprk/pages/commissioninquiryonhrindprk.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). See also Rep. of the International
Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and Circumstances of the Events of 28 September 2009
in Guinea, transmitted by Letter Dated 18 December 2009 Addressed to the President of the Security Council
by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2009/693 (Dec. 18, 2009).
350 U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Comm’n of Inquiry into Human Rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 17, 2014).
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population.351 The Report does not define “civilian population,” but notes that
“the inhumane acts . . . must form part of a larger attack against a civilian
population,” and addressed the plight of six categories of victims, including
inmates of political prison camps, persons who try to flee the country, starving
populations, and persons from other countries who become victims of
international abductions and forced disappearances.352
The Report identified these groups of persons who comprised the civilian
population largely without regard to precedent from the ad hoc tribunals.353 It
found that the crimes alleged were perpetrated by the leader of “a single-party
state dominated by a family dynasty which controls the party, the state and the
military.”354 The situation in North Korea does not involve either an
international or non-international armed conflict, and most closely resembles, if
not peacetime, a situation in which armed conflict is absent. Therefore, the
Report did not elaborate on the victims’ status as civilians, presumably since, in
the absence of armed conflict, it would be difficult to categorize them as
anything else.
c. General Principles of Law
Under Article 21(1)(c), the Court may consider:
[G]eneral principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of
legal systems of the world . . . provided that those principles are not
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and
internationally recognized norms and standards.355

A brief survey of national legislation and national case law on crimes against
humanity could be helpful to assess whether there were relevant interpretations
of the meaning of “civilian population” either in national legislation or case law.
Generally speaking, States with legislation on crimes against humanity typically
copy or incorporate by reference the text of the Rome Statute. Of the thirty-one
countries surveyed for this Article, all used (without definition) the term
“civilian,” “civilian population” or a similar locution.356 An exception is the

351

Id. ¶ 1027.
Id. ¶ 1024.
353 See generally id. (failing to address precedent from ad hoc tribunals).
354 Id. ¶ 85.
355 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 21(1)(c).
356 Benjamin Cohen, Civilian Population in Crimes Against Humanity Charges Before National Courts
(Apr. 15, 2014) (Washington University School of Law) (on file with author).
352
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Estonian law cited in the Kolk decision, discussed above.357 George Washington
University Law School’s Human Rights Clinic has recently conducted a
comprehensive study of national legislation on crimes against humanity which
arrives at a similar conclusion.358
The difficulty with relying upon national legislation as a source of general
international law, is that, as with the Rome Statute, the term “civilian
population” is not defined. It may therefore be useful to examine national case
law, at least in some of the more prominent national cases on the question. The
most often-cited is the Barbie case from France, which is most commonly
referenced for its holding that members of Resistance groups may be the victims
of crimes against humanity.359 The lower courts had dismissed counts involving
Barbie’s torture or murder of Jewish members of the Resistance on the grounds
that, if the accused had tortured them because they were members of the
Resistance (rather than because they were Jewish), these could “only” constitute
war crimes as opposed to crimes against humanity.360 Under French law, this
required dismissal as they would have prescribed under France’s statute of
limitations.361
The Court of Cassation reversed, finding that “inhumane acts and
persecutions . . . committed in a systematic fashion, not only against persons
because they belong to a racial or religious group, but also against the
adversaries of this [State] policy, whatever the form of their opposition” could
be prosecuted.362 This case may be less about who is a civilian, however, and
more about who can be the victim of a crime against humanity during an attack
on a civilian population.
Finally, the ICC has considered general principles of law on a number of
occasions but appears resistant to applying such principles in cases heard before

357

See supra Part II.C.4(b).
Arturo J. Carrillo & Annalise K. Nelson, Comparative Law Study and Analysis of National Legislation
Relating to Crimes Against Humanity and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 8, 9
(2013).
359 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 20, 1985, Bull crim., No. 407
(Fr.). See Leila Sadat, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From
Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289, 340–42 (1994) (formerly Wexler).
360 Cour de cassation [Cass.] crim., Bull crim., No. 407, supra note 359.
361 Id.
362 Id.
358
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it.363 Indeed, the Court has recalled that it is not bound by national law in any
respect.364
5. Construing the Provision with the Objective of Protecting the Rights of
the Accused and Ensuring That the Application of the Statute Is
Consistent with Internationally Recognized Human Rights (Canon 5)
Thus far we have seen that no clear answer regarding the meaning of the term
“civilian” or “civilian population” emerges from either a textual understanding
of the ICC Statute, the Statute’s travaux préparatoires, customary international
law, or international treaties. This brings policy considerations to the fore in
considering the meaning of the term.
Canon 5 is meant to operationalize Article 22(1) of the ICC Statute, which
provides: “The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be
extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in
favor of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”365 This
provision incorporates the legality principle, protecting the accused from
unforeseeable or retroactive applications of the Statute. Although gap filling and
interpretation are inevitable, unjustified interpretative leaps risk destroying the
legitimacy of the Court and run afoul not only of Article 22(1) but Article 21(3)’s
admonition that the “application and interpretation of law pursuant to this Article
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”366
As noted earlier, the object and purpose of Article 7, and crimes against
humanity as a category of offenses more generally, is to reach cases involving
the commission of atrocity crimes to which the laws of war do not apply (either
because there is a gap during armed conflict or the attack takes place in
363 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision on the Practices of
Witness Familiarization and Witness Proofing, ¶¶ 35–42 (Pre-Trial Chamber Nov. 8, 2006) (using the absence
of general principles of national law to reject the definition of “witness-proofing” advanced by the Prosecution);
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12-4, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,
Concurring Opinion of Judge Wyngaert, ¶ 17 (Trial Chamber Dec. 18, 2012) (declining to use general principles
of national law when defining modes of liability, stating that national law on the issue was fragmented); Situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-168, Judgment on the Prosecution’s Application for
Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, ¶¶ 21–32
(July 13, 2006). The Appeals Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s argument that a supposed lacuna in the Rules
of Evidence and Procedure could be filled by applying general principles of law as no general principle relevant
to the proposed lacuna could be ascertained. Id. ¶ 32.
364 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE 394 (2010).
365 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 22(1).
366 Id. art. 21(3).
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peacetime); and the purpose was to provide protection for individuals from
attack (military or non-military) in the form of widespread or systematic human
rights abuses perpetrated by States (or non-State actors).367
During armed conflict, there is a certain protection offered to the accused if
the Statute’s provisions on Article 7 and Article 8 are aligned, in that an attack
which does not violate Article 8 because it does not involve “intentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities,” also will not violate Article 7.368 This means
that if a commander complies with the laws of war in their targeting, they will
not somehow nonetheless commit a crime against humanity. This is the approach
taken at the ICTY369 and the SCSL.370
Although the ICTY could have taken a different course, making targeting
and other strategic decisions more difficult for commanders during armed
conflict but interpreting the scope of crimes against humanity law’s application
as broader than the protections offered by the laws of war, it is understandable
that it did not, and, indeed, it is supported by Canon 5. It is worth noting,
however, that the addition of the words “or against individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities,” may suggest a broader understanding of the term
“civilian” in the ICC Statute than the definition found in Article 50 of AP I even
for international armed conflicts, suggesting that individual status—not formal
status—is the relevant criterion.371
In terms of non-international armed conflict, Article 8(2)(e)(i) uses the same
language, rendering criminal “intentionally directing attacks against the civilian
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities.”372 This language suggests that particularly in NIACs, the notion of
“taking direct part in hostilities,” should be the relevant test rather than the
formalistic approach of Article 50 of AP I.373 This would be consistent with the
jurisprudence of the Rwanda Tribunal, and therefore presumably neither
unforeseeable nor unduly prejudicial to the accused.

367
368
369
370
371
372
373

See supra Part II.C.2.
Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b)(i).
See supra Part I.A.1(a).
See supra Part I.A.1(b).
Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b)(i); Additional Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 50.
Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(e)(i).
Additional Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 50. It is also consistent with the approach of the ICRC.
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Finally, in peacetime, Article 8 has no application.374 Thus it cannot violate
Article 21(3) to include all individuals as “civilians” during peacetime, as an
accused could not reasonably harbor an expectation that an attack on anyone
involving the widespread or systematic commission of Article 7 crimes was
lawful given the egregious nature of those crimes, and the inapplicability of the
laws of war as a formal matter. Although there is jurisprudence suggesting that
members of the armed forces are not “civilians” for the purposes of crimes
against humanity law,375 that jurisprudence does not unpack or address the
fundamental differences between the ICC Statute and its predecessors, and has
been criticized by scholars, including in a recent amicus brief filed before the
ECCC.376
Finally, as a practical matter, if the ICC takes the position that the victims of
an Article 7 violation need not themselves be civilians once the jurisdictional
element of the “attack directed against any civilian population” has been
established, which is the view propounded by the ICTY and the ECCC,377 the
result of this Article’s methodology should not be very different than the results
now being obtained before the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.
6. Enhancing Judicial Efficiency and the Effectiveness of the ICC Trial
System without Comprising the Values Expressed in Canon 4 (Canon 6)
In my earlier writings I have criticized the ICC for producing overly complex
and creative interpretations of the Rome Statute in its jurisprudence on modes
of liability, and its early jurisprudence that forbade charging alternative modes
of liability.378 I have argued that judges should seek to interpret the Rome Statute
in a manner that does not promote fruitless litigation but furthers instead the
efficiency and transparency of the ICC trial process.379 In this Article, however,
I have urged Chambers to “complicate” Article 7 by taking a non-unitary
approach to the notion of “civilian population” depending upon whether or not
a situation involves the commission of crimes against humanity in peacetime,

374

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Judgement, supra note 41; supra notes 41, 77 and
accompanying text.
376 See Brief of Professors Robinson, deGuzman, Jalloh, & Cryer on Crimes Against Humanity as Amici
Curiae, Cases 003 and 004, No. 003/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ (E.C.C.C. May 17, 1016).
377 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 549 (Jan. 14, 2000).
378 Sadat & Jolly, supra note 62, at 768–69.
379 Id. at 768.
375
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during non-international armed conflict, or during international armed
conflict.380 This apparent inconsistency requires explanation.
As I have written elsewhere, in my view, the decision of the Court’s judges
to depart sharply from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on modes of
liability, and to insert instead the “control of the crime theory” into the ICC
Statute violated not only Canon 5, but the other six Canons I have suggested as
well.381 It does not square with either the plain meaning or the object and purpose
of the Statute, it was not supported by the travaux préparatoires or by a theory
of general principles of law, and was arguably inconsistent with customary
international law.382 This is not so for my proposal regarding Article 7 and the
meaning of “civilian population” which is both consistent with Canons 1–5 and
7, even if not mandated by them, and, moreover, is a complexity inherent in the
structure of the Rome Statute itself as well as the laws of war and peace. It is
Article 8 that makes the distinction between war and peace, and Article 8 that
further distinguishes non-international and international armed conflicts from
each other;383 and it is international law as a whole which has a presumption of
peacetime application, with IHL applicable only in cases of armed conflict. Thus
the complexity I am suggesting to the Court is not something created by the
Rome Statute (or this Article), but is part of the international legal system in
which the Rome Statute is embedded. This brings me to my final point below.
7. Enhancing the Expressive and Normative Function of International
Criminal Law by Rendering It Transparent and Comprehensible and
Reducing Opportunities for Fragmentation (Canon 7)
I have suggested a methodology that will not fragment international criminal
law but will build upon existing jurisprudence while at the same time allowing
the ICC the freedom to chart its own course in a manner more consistent with
its Statute. It allows appropriate provisions of IHL to be overlaid over the
peacetime understanding of crimes against humanity that this Article is premised
upon as a lex specialis. This permits the jurisprudence of the ICTY using Article
50 of AP I and the jurisprudence of the ICTR using the notion of “direct
380 It may not be necessary to distinguish NIAC from IAC, although as a formal matter, the formal
inapplicability of Protocol I, as well as the debates regarding the notion of “combatant” status in NIAC, suggest
that the law is not completely clear in this regard. This Article continues to employ the distinction, as it is found
in the ICC Statute, whilst recognizing the conceptual convergence of the law relating to these two different types
of armed conflict.
381 Sadat & Jolly, supra note 62, at 781–85.
382 Id. at 781.
383 See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8.
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participation in hostilities” to be relied upon by the Court as it constructs its
understanding of crimes against humanity committed during armed conflict.384
During peacetime, however, when IHL does not formally apply, it requires the
Court to presumptively consider all individuals to be part of the “civilian
population” if they are the object of attack. This is a break with the Blaškić
Appeals Judgment’s emphasis on formal status, rather than actual situation, but
it is a natural development of the law given the application of the ICC Statute to
new situations.
Putting peacetime first also has a critically important normative
component—it rejects the paradigm of “perpetual war,” promotes peace as a
fundamental value, as well as justice, and gives crimes against humanity an
autonomous meaning, separate from its linkage to war and its excesses,
something many delegations emphasized in Rome during the Statute’s
negotiation.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Rome Statute recognized that the definition of crimes
against humanity in Article 7 needed amendment if they were to finally remove
the armed conflict nexus that had troubled the crime since Nuremberg. But how
much? They did not adopt AP I’s definition of “attack” in Article 49 (acts of
violence against the adversary) but gave the word “attack” in Article 7 an
autonomous meaning in the Statute and the Elements of Crimes (a course of
conduct, which need not be a military campaign).385 It would have been helpful
had they done the same thing for the term “civilian” but they did not. This lack
of guidance has left the ICC Chambers, following the case law of the ad hoc
tribunals, to borrow from international humanitarian law to define the term
“civilian” in Article 7. This borrowing has been haphazard, however. The
situation of the ICC is not the same as the situation at the ad hoc tribunals,
particularly the ICTY, which had a clear linkage to armed conflict in its
provision on crimes against humanity and therefore was more properly
concerned about aligning crimes against humanity with the laws of war.
Moreover, the Blaškić Appeals Judgment, while influential, has not been
uniformly followed, giving rise to a question about its authoritativeness. It has
also been criticized by distinguished scholars who have objected to the
“mechanical transfer” of IHL provisions to crimes against humanity law, as
384
385

See supra Part I.
Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(3); Elements of Crimes, supra note 13, art. 7, ¶ 3.
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“fail[ing] to acknowledge the object and purpose of the latter, that is, the
protection of individuals, and must therefore be rejected.”386
It therefore seems useful to treat this as a question of de novo interpretation,
looking to the seven canons outlined above in Part II.C. The first and foremost
consideration is the plain reading of the text of the Statute (Article 21(1)(a)),
using ordinary principles of treaty interpretation and consideration of the
context. In IHL, the term “civilian population” has a specific meaning in the
context of armed conflict. “Civilians” are those who do not bear arms and
therefore cannot be directly attacked. This meaning arguably changes depending
upon whether a conflict is international or non-international. In peacetime,
however, IHL does not apply, and the Statute itself notes that an attack need not
be a military attack, thereby explicitly separating crimes against humanity from
armed conflict.
In English, a “civilian” means a “non-military person,” or someone not a
member of the armed forces on active duty. This definition is generally accepted
at the ad hoc tribunals and when extended to “civilian population” appears to
mean “a group of persons primarily composed of civilians.” In IHL, the term
“civilian” evolved to distinguish individuals who may lawfully bear arms from
those who cannot—and those who cannot are protected from direct attack.387
Since all “attacks” are presumptively unlawful in peacetime, several delegations
properly wished to delete the term “civilian” during the negotiation of the Rome
Statute.
How to square the circle? This is where principles two, three, and four may
be useful. It may also be helpful to consider the question in light of the Statute’s
object and purpose, applicable treaties, customary international law including—
in a limited way—the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, and even general
principles of law if no answer otherwise emerges. In terms of the ICC Statute’s
object and purpose, historically, the object was to reach cases in which the laws
of war did not apply; the purpose was to provide protection for individuals from
attack in the form of widespread or systematic criminal activity which largely
takes the form of human rights abuses perpetrated by states or qualifying
organizations. Critically important at Nuremberg was the protection of the
Aggressor State’s own nationals, who would not be deemed “protected” under
international humanitarian law. Since IHL provides no protection in peacetime
explicitly, Article 7 (and Article 6 on genocide) should arguably be construed
386
387

WERLE & JEßBERGER, supra note 45, ¶ 888.
See, e.g., supra Part II.C.4(a).
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broadly to provide to the greatest number of individuals protection from the
crimes listed in Article 7(1).
The ad hoc tribunals understood this and several of the ICTR cases and some
of the jurisprudence from the ICTY explicitly suggests this. Kayishema, in
particular, notes that the legal definition of “civilian” and “civilian population”
must be discussed within the “context of war as well as relative peace”388 and
should be broad. The Trial Chamber decisions in Tadić and Blaškić adopted a
similarly broad reading of civilian and civilian population, aiming at providing
the greatest protection possible to those not participating in the fighting and who
could not be considered potential perpetrators.389 The Blaškić Trial Chamber
suggested as well that it would be appropriate to focus upon the situation of the
victim as opposed to the victim’s status, which had the effect again of aligning
the interpretation of crimes against humanity with the origins of the term
“civilian” in the laws of war, which was to protect persons not involved in
fighting from attack.390 This would mean that former soldiers, captured soldiers,
and those hors de combat due to injury or illness would presumably fall within
the definition of civilian and civilian population, and would provide a useful way
to determine when and if police and firefighters would be civilians (as the ICRC
and the ECCC suggest)391 or non-civilians (as the ICTR has suggested, based
upon their status as perpetrators).392
This early case law was not available during the negotiation of the Rome
Statute, but it was presented to the drafters during the elaboration of the
Elements of Crimes. Thus, it is fair to assume that they knew about it.
Subsequently, the ICTY narrowed its approach, taking verbatim Article 50 of
AP I as the relevant test.393 This had the advantage—for that Tribunal—of
completely aligning its provisions on war crimes and crimes against humanity
so that an attack directed against the civilian population would not have a
broader meaning in the context of crimes against humanity than it did for war
crimes. Given the explicit requirement of a connection between crimes against
humanity and armed conflict in the ICTY Statute, this may have been a logical

388
389
390
391
392
393

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Judgement, supra note 123, ¶ 127.
For a discussion of the Blaškić Trial Judgement see supra Part I.A.1(a).
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgement, supra note 75.
Case 002, Judgement, supra note 89, ¶ 196; see supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.2(a).
See supra Part I.A.1(a).

SADAT GALLEYSPROOFS2

266

2/27/2017 2:39 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

development, although as others have noted, it is objectionable on both textual
and policy grounds.394
While the policy behind this jurisprudence may be sensible, the importation
of a strict humanitarian law definition into crimes against humanity was
problematic even at the ICTY as it began to create problems based upon status.
When the problem of individuals hors de combat subsequently arose, the ICTY
Chambers struggled with the idea, and in Martić, the Trial Chamber found that
they had no protection from crimes against humanity based upon their status as
members of the armed forces.395 This is illogical, given that they could not be
mistreated under the laws of war; why then deprive them of the additional
protection of crimes against humanity given that most of the acts prohibited in
Article 7(1) are also unlawful under the laws of war?396 Recognizing this, the
Appeals Chamber in Martić devised an elegant solution to the problem
generated by IHL’s reliance upon status: It found that not all victims of an attack
on a civilian population need be civilians once the attack on the civilian
population was established, meaning that soldiers hors de combat could still be
the victims of crimes against humanity even if they retained the status of noncivilians. The ECCC took this a step further to find that purges of members of
the armed forces by the Khmer Rouge regime were crimes against humanity
given that they were “civilians or, at a minimum, hors de combat, thereby
enjoying the same protection as civilians.”397
Thus, we see, in the context of armed conflict, two trends in the jurisprudence
to align the protection of the laws of war with crimes against humanity: The first
more directly examines the actual situation of the victim group to determine if it
forms part of the population protected from attack under IHL; the second
eschews examination of the actual situation in favor of looking at the formal
status of the population involved as determined by Article 50 of AP I (which is
applied equally to international and non-international armed conflicts by some
of the case law in spite of its formal inapplicability to the latter), but then
suggesting that they may still be the victims of crimes against humanity even
though they are not civilians. Which solution is to be preferred?

394

See, e.g., WERLE & JEßBERGER, supra note 45, ¶ 888.
Prosecutor v. Martić, Trial Judgement, supra note 89.
396 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1). The one exception is arguably imprisonment under Article
7(1)(e), which might be lawful; but since it is consistent with international law to detain soldiers hors de combat,
this provision would not apply. Id.
397 Case 002, Judgement, supra note 89, ¶ 194. For further discussion see supra notes 152–57 and
accompanying text.
395
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It must initially be determined whether choosing one or another
interpretation results in any prejudice to the accused, which is forbidden by
Articles 21(3) and 22(2) of the Statute.398 These provisions require the human
rights of the accused to be respected and the definition of crimes to be “strictly
construed.”399 Given that this is an open question, and that either solution would
be “foreseeable,” which is the test that the European Court of Human Rights has
adopted for the principle of legality,400 it seems that either option is available to
ICC Chambers in approaching this question. Indeed, both theories have been
advanced at one time or another by the ad hoc tribunals. Where a clear answer
does not appear, I have suggested some policy reasons to guide the Court:
judicial efficiency, the effectiveness of the ICC trial system, the expressive and
normative function of international criminal law, the transparency and
comprehension of international criminal law and avoiding fragmentation if
possible. There may be others, as well.
It may well be more efficient to take a “formal” and status-based approach to
this question, defining civilian under AP I regardless of the actual scenario
presented to the Court. Indeed, some of the early decisions of the ICC Chambers
clearly did this, using AP I as the relevant definition even in peacetime.
However, there are reasons to be concerned about this approach.
First, it undermines the object and purpose of Article 7 (and Article 6), which
permit ICC prosecutions to go forward even in situations short of armed conflict.
Broadening the concept of civilian in peacetime to protect individuals who are
targeted for the crimes in Article 7(1) to include members of the armed forces
attacked in a purge is both logical and consistent with the sparse case law
considering this possibility. Second, the ICC has already accepted this as a
possibility with respect to U.N. Peacekeepers, finding in Abu Garda that their
situation, as opposed to their status, is the relevant test.401
Third, during armed conflict, it may be necessary to layer IHL concepts on
this peacetime conceptualization of “civilian population” due to IHL’s operation
as the lex specialis. To the extent that the purpose, again, is to distinguish those
protected from attack from those not protected from attack, it is important to
note that the ICRC and the Protocols make distinctions between those protected
in international and non-international armed conflict. In international armed
398
399
400
401

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 21(3).
Id. art. 22(3).
See SW v. U.K., Merits & Just Satisfaction, 335-B & 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 34, 36 (1995).
See Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Decision, supra note 180 and accompanying text.

SADAT GALLEYSPROOFS2

268

2/27/2017 2:39 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

conflict, the emphasis is on formal status for operation of the principle of
distinction; but individuals hors de combat are also protected, just under
different provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. For this
reason, it seems consistent with IHL to adopt a situation-specific as opposed to
formal status definition even in international armed conflict.
In non-international armed conflict, the ICRC adopts the notion of
“continuous combat function” to distinguish those individuals who can be
targeted for purposes of the principle of distinction, from those who cannot.
Although this is a contested area of IHL,402 the ICRC’s work is highly
authoritative. To the extent the goal is to align the provisions of Article 8 and
Article 7 in terms of civilian protection, this approach should at least be given
serious consideration, rather than the transposition of AP I Article 50 into the
law of crimes against humanity.
We thus arrive at a three-part test for case-by-case resolution of these issues
at the ICC: First, the situation is categorized depending upon whether or not it
involves crimes committed during or outside of armed conflict. If the crimes
have been committed during peacetime, all individuals are presumptively
civilians, and are part of the “population” protected by Article 7, even members
of the armed forces and the police assuming they are not perpetrating the attacks.
Second, if the crimes have been committed during an armed conflict, the
question arises whether it is international or non-international in nature. In that
case, the targeted victim population’s formal status is assessed under IHL as the
lex specialis, although this does not end the inquiry.
Third, the specific situation of the victims is considered, while also taking
into consideration, to the extent relevant, the provisions of IHL applicable in
international and non-international armed conflict, but without mechanically
transferring those provisions to Article 7, particularly as regards the notion of
“protected person,” which can have no application in Article 7.403 In practical
terms, this means that the soldiers attacked by the Khmer Rouge regime were
402 Compare Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 21–24 (2010) (arguing that the continuous combat
function criterion “badly distorts the military necessity-humanitarian balance” of international humanitarian
law), with Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 831, 846–51 (2010) (contending that the continuous combat approach “best reflects” current
understandings of organized armed groups).
403 WERLE & JEßBERGER, supra note 45, ¶ 888. It also appears to have less and less relevance in IHL, at
least as regards the applicability of Common Article 3. See supra note 43.
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part of the “civilian population” protected by the law of crimes against humanity,
as were the individuals allegedly abducted and cruelly mistreated by Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo who did not “lose” their civilian status when taken into his armed
group, except during and to the extent that they are actually directly participating
in hostilities, and then only as regards the application of the principle of
distinction, and not with respect to the commission of other Article 7 crimes.
Although this proposed three-part test is more complex than the simple
formula of AP I, its adoption could enhance the expressive function of the ICC
Statute by making it clear that the definition of civilian population in Article 7
is premised, in the first instance, not upon the formal rules of international
humanitarian law, but upon a peacetime understanding of the crime that takes
into account the actual situation of the victim population. It also squares with
our common sense understanding, in the examples given above, about who is
deserving of Rome Statute protection, and avoids creating gaps in the Statute’s
protective mantle. Moreover, as noted above, this complexity is inherent in the
international legal order in which the Rome Statute is embedded, and is not an
artifact of the Statute but a consequence of the manner in which international
law has developed over time. Finally, it honors the wishes of the Framers of the
Rome Statute by adopting the kind of case-by-case approach they suggested
would be appropriate for the resolution of this question during the Statute’s
negotiation.

